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CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE ABUSES: CAN STATE
LEGISLATION SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
David Pimentel
INTRODUCTION
Civil asset forfeiture is an extraordinarily powerful tool for law
enforcement, allowing the seizure of assets on mere suspicion, or probable
cause, without any proof of wrongdoing. 1 Police seize such assets without
notice or warrant, and as much as 88 percent of these seizures are effected
without any court hearing or other judicial oversight.2 The constitutionality
of civil forfeitures has been consistently upheld in decisions that show only
the most limited recognition of the rights of the property owners, even
entirely innocent ones.3 Accordingly, the potential for abuse of the procedure
by law enforcement is great, particularly given the powerful incentives it
creates; indeed, the law enforcement agencies that seize these assets (or
cooperate with each other in their seizure) are almost always permitted to
keep whatever they seize for their own use.4
Civil libertarians on both sides of the political aisle in the United States
have expressed outrage at the practice, the left citing the police's abuse of the
civil forfeiture power,5 and the right complaining of the assault on individual
property rights.6 The shared concern has spawned some legislative efforts to
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1 See, e.g., Sarah StiUman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12 & 19, 2013),
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken.
2 See Darpana Sheth, Incentives Matter: The Not-So-Civil Side of Civil Forfeiture, FED. LAW., July
2016, at 46, 47-48 (citing Dick M. Carpenter et al., Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset
Forfeiture, 2 INST. FOR JUST. 1, 12-13 & fig. 4 (2d ed, 2015), https://ij.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/ 1/policing-for-profit-2nd-edition.pdf).
3 See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 97-139A, CRIME AND FORFEITURE at
27-39 (January 22, 2015).
4 See David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court, 13
NEV. LJ. 1, 31 (2012).
5 See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The Injustice of Civil-A sset Forfeiture, ATL4NTIC (May 12, 2015),
htps://www.theatiantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/the-glaring-injusice-of-civil-asset-
forfeiture/392999/; Stillman, supra note I, at 6; Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Civil Forfeiture
(HBO television broadcast Oct. 5, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kEpZWGgJks.
6 See, e.g., HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM
SEizuRE? 5 (Cato Inst. 1995); Radley Balko, Forfeiture Folly: Cover Your Assets, REASON.COM (Mar. 7,
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rein in the abuses. Congress's effort, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
of 2000, had a modest impact but failed to address the core problems
underlying forfeiture abuse in the federal system.7 The utter absence of
bipartisanship in Congress today,8 as well as the Trump administration's
staunch support for expansive use of forfeitures,9 suggests the hopelessness
of a further legislative fix at the federal level.
Greater interest at present and, perhaps, greater hope lie with the
potential for reform on the state level. Some states have already weighed in,
enacting civil asset forfeiture reform in various forms, and others are
considering bills that would similarly circumscribe the practice, or at least
rein in the worst abuses of it. 10 Resistance to the proposed reforms comes
primarily from the law enforcement community,II for whom civil asset
forfeiture is a powerful tool, but the sincerity of law enforcement's policy
arguments can be called into question, given the huge payoff those agencies
get from continuing the practice. And even where reforms are implemented,
powerful financial incentives may prompt police to find loopholes or
workarounds that will allow them to continue the practice. 12 The upshot is a
patchwork of mixed results, and marginal impact, in these various attempts
2008, 7:51 AM), http://reasontcom/archives/2008/03/07/forfeiture-folly; Chip Mellor, Civil Forfeiture
Laws and the Continued Assault on Private Property, FORBES (June 8, 2011, 5:30 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2011/06/08/property-ivil-forfeiture.html ("Civil forfeiture laws represent one of
the most serious assaults on private property rights in the nation today. Under civil forfeiture, police and
prosecutors can seize your car or other property, sell it and use the proceeds to fund agency budgets-all
without so much as charging you with a crime."); Richard Miniter, Ill-Gotten Gains, REASON.COM (Aug.
1, 1993, 12:00 AM), http.//reason.com/archives/1993/08/01/ill-gotten-gains/.
7 Pimentel, supra note 4, at 15-16.
8 See Christopher Hare, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Polarization in Congress Has Risen
Sharply. Where Is it Going Next? WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.connews/
monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/13/polarization-in-congress-has-risen-sharply-where-is-it-going-next/ ("The
most recent data show that polarization in Congress reached a new record high in 2013.").
9 See Christopher Ingraham, Trump Jokes with Sheriffs about Destroying a Texas Legislator's
Career over Asset Forfeiture, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2017/02/07/trmp-jokes-with-sheriffs-abot -destroying-a-texas-legislators-career-over-asset-
forfeiture/. While the exchange with sheriffs demonstrated the President's general ignorance of the issues,
suggesting that this may not be a considered policy position, Attorney General Jeff Sessions has a well-
established record in support of expansive use of forfeitures, and opposition to any reform. See Johnny
Kampis, AG Nominee Sessions Champions Civil Asset Forfeiture, Worrying Reform
Advocates, WATCHDOG.ORG (Dec. 15, 2016) http://watchdogorg/284348/sessions-ivil-asset-forfeiture/;
George Leef, Sessions Has No Problem With Civil Asset Forfeiture - And That's A Problem, FORBES
(Jan. 3, 2017, 12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.comsitesgeorgelee2Ol17/01l/03/sessions-has-no-problem-
with-civil-asset-forfeiture-and-thats-a-problem/#541d
9 9fe2 d38. Accordingly, it is fair to infer that the
Trump administration will not be pressing for forfeiture reform in the foreseeable future.
10 See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 
2 3 .
11 Id. at 24 ("A common refrain in the states where reform efforts have been unsuccessful is that
resistance from law enforcement leaders killed the bills.").
12 id.
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to fix the forfeiture problem at the state level. Indeed, the limited impact of
these efforts suggests that a closer look is warranted.
This Article analyzes some of the approaches taken in the various states,
in an effort to understand why reform of civil asset forfeiture has failed in so
many of them. It proposes specific approaches to state legislation to close
loopholes that law enforcement agencies can exploit and for which they may
actively lobby in the reform legislation itself. Public outrage and bipartisan
concern are prompting action, but better legal guidance is needed if state
legislative solutions are to be effective.
Part I of the Article provides the historical background of civil asset
forfeiture and highlights the inequities inherent in the procedure. It discusses
how civil asset forfeitures work in practice today, including the problematic
allocation of burdens of proof, and gives an overview of the recent attempts
at reform, including the federal Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000.
Part II of the Article details the various approaches that states have
implemented to stem the abuse of civil asset forfeitures, including attempts
to eliminate them altogether. It discusses how virtually every one of these
efforts-mostly in shifting or raising burdens of proof-has fallen short, due
in large part to the powerful financial incentives for law enforcement to
continue to employ the practice. States wishing to address the problem should
learn from the lessons of others as they attempt to close the loopholes
exposed by other states' reform efforts and, perhaps most importantly, shut
off the financial incentive spigot that drives and perpetuates the problem.
I. BACKGROUND ON CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE
A. What Is Civil Asset Forfeiture?
Civil asset forfeiture is a procedure by which law enforcement can seize
assets implicated in the commission of a crime. Although it has ancient roots,
its modern incarnation grew out of the Navigation Acts of Great Britain in
the 17th century.13 These laws allowed the seizure of ships used for piracy or
smuggling, establishing an in rem procedure by which legal action was
brought by the state against the ship itself.1 4 The constitutionality of the
procedure was first upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1820s in the
context of ship seizures"s but has been consistently upheld in more recent
cases involving the seizure of automobiles, even when the owner of the
property is entirely innocent of any wrongdoing.16 The technical legal
13 DOYLE, supra note 3, at 2.
14 id.
15 See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)], 15 (1827).
16 See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 446 (1996); JW. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505, 513 (1921). Note, however, that Justice Thomas, who sided with the majority in
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rationale is that if the "property is guilty," then the innocence of the owner is
irrelevant in an in rem action.'
7
Criminal forfeitures, in contrast, are done in personam and can be
carried out only after the owner of the property has been convicted of a
crime.18 If the property has a sufficiently strong connection to the crime, the
forfeiture becomes a part of the criminal punishment carried out. 1
9 Because
of the procedural protections enjoyed by the owner/defendant in these cases,
criminal forfeitures are far less problematic and, of course, far less
controversial.
1. Three Types of Civil Asset Forfeiture
Conceptually, there are three circumstances in which civil asset
forfeitures are triggered, or more precisely, three types of property that are
forfeitable.0 First is contraband, which can be seized because it is unlawful
to possess in the first place.2' This type of forfeiture is uncontroversial, as no
one can assert a legitimate property interest in assets such as illegal drugs,
adulterated food, or obscene material.
22
Second are proceeds of crime. Starting with the passage of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") in 1970, and in a
number of statutes enacted thereafter (including, most notably, federal drug
laws), the proceeds of criminal activity have been deemed forfeitable.
23 This
is justifiable as a legitimate law enforcement tool-taking the profit out of
crime is important in deterring its commission
4-as well as under the general
theory of unjust enrichment, as there is something inequitable about allowing
Bennis, has recently raised doubts about the constitutionality of civil forfeitures as currently practiced.
See Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
17 See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 461 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18 See, e.g., Alice W. Dery, Overview of Asset Forfeiture, BUS. L. TODAY 4 (June 2012),
https//www.americanbar.org/publications/blt
/2012/06/02_dery.htnl.
19 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICY MANUAL: ASSET FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL 71-72 (2016),
https://www.justice.gov/criiinal-aflsfile/839521/download.
20 David Pimentel, Forfeiture Procedure in Federal Court: An Overview, 183 F.R.D. 1, 5-6 (1999)
(quoting Bennis, 516 U.S. at 459 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
21 Id. at 6.
22 id.
23 Id.
24 RICO was specifically responding to the problem of organized crime figures, who would be
convicted and serve time, only to be replaced by others who would assume the leadership of the vast crime
empires left behind. See Pimentel, supra note 4, at 11 (quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL:
THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 67 (1996)) ("When [the] Attorney General ... first testified before 
the
Senate committee that was considering measures against organized crime, his main point was that as long
as the flow of money continued, imprisonment of the leaders of Mafia families stimulated the promotions
of new people to take the places of those convicted.").
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a wrongdoer to keep ill-received gains.21 Again, it is difficult for the owner
of such property to assert any legitimate property right in such proceeds.26
Third, and most problematic, are the instrumentalities of crime, better
characterized as facilitating property.27 This was the rationale for the
historical seizure of ships: if they have been used to commit crimes against
the crown, they may be properly seizedn The justification is somewhat
harder to define here than it is for contraband or proceeds of crime, although
it has been articulated in terms of deterrence in two ways: (1) if the ship is
seized, it can no longer be used for this purpose (absent the forfeiture, there
may be nothing preventing its falling into the hands of other criminals who
will use it for the same purpose), and (2) it creates an incentive for property
owners to take care to ensure that their property is not used by others,
including strangers, to further criminal activity. 29
2. The Problems with Civil Asset Forfeiture
The core problems with civil asset forfeiture-almost exclusively
applicable to the third category, or "facilitating property" forfeitures-
include the following:
(1) The ease with which law enforcement can take the property with
little regard for the private property rights of the owner, in light of the low
standards of proof necessary to effect a forfeiture,30 and that even these
standards are rarely required to be met because often the forfeiture is
25 Pimentel, supra note 4, at 36.
26 The Fourth Circuit has complained that proceeds forfeitures can be punitive, however,
particularly in conspiracy cases or other cases where there is joint and several liability for the proceeds.
In those cases, one minor player in, for example, a large drug conspiracy, may be forced to forfeit the
entire proceeds of the conspiracy, even though that individual never saw more than a tiny fraction of those
proceeds. United States v. Jalaram, Inc., 599 F.3d 347, 355 (4th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the split of authority that emerged, see Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 588,
588-89 (2016), and held that joint and several liability did not apply. Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S.
Ct. 1626, 1631-32 (2017).
27 See Pimentel, supra note 20, at 6.
28 See Pimentel, supra note 4, at 8-9.
29 Ifa ship is forfeitable because a single seaman is smuggling illegal goods in his duffle, the ship
owner has powerful incentives to police the crew to ensure that such violations are not occurring on board.
See Pimentel, supra note 20, at 6.
30 Compare MASS. GEN. LAwS ch. 94C, § 47(d) (2017) (noting that "the commonwealth shall have
the burden of proving to the court the existence of probable cause to institute the [forfeiture] action"), with
18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2012 & Supp I11 2016) ("jT]he burden of proof is on the Government to establish,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.'), and D.C. CODE § 41-
308(d)(1XB) (2017) (providing a preponderance standard, except for vehicles and real property), andTEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 59.05(b) (2017) ("The state has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that property is subject to forfeiture.').
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executed "administratively," without a hearing where the parties might have
been put to their proofs.3'
(2) The fact that innocent property owners are at risk of forfeiture
because forfeitability turns on the guilt of the property, not the guilt of its
owner, and even in those jurisdictions that recognize an "innocent owner"
defense, the burden is typically on the owner to prove his or her own
innocence.
3 2
(3) The disturbingly powerful incentives for law enforcement to make
such seizures (rising to the level of a conflict of interest), borne of the reality
that the law enforcement agencies themselves are typically allowed to keep
whatever they seize for their own use.33
Anecdotes about the abuse of civil forfeitures are easy to find. The
popular press and media have seized on these stories, milking them for their
shock value, as they offend some basic notions of justice and decency that
Americans take for granted. These stories fall into two key categories-
namely, (1) the seizures of cash on suspicion of drug activity, when the
suspicion is based entirely, or almost entirely, on the existence of the cash
itself (the assumption being that it must be dirty money because law-abiding
citizens don't carry large quantities of cash),1 and (2) seizures of property
owned by an entirely innocent, or almost entirely innocent, party because a
wrongdoer has used the property for illegal purposes.
35 The law often proves
to be impotent to vindicate the rights of the victims of these forfeitures. The
outrageous outcomes and tragic consequences of these cases make a
compelling case for legal reform.
31 Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 12-13.
32 id. at 8, 20.
33 See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic
Agenda, 65 U. Cl-. L. REv. 35,56 (1998).
34 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 106-192, at 6-7 (1999) (telling the story of Willie Jones having $9,000
in cash seized from him at a Tennessee airport alter dogs identified the money, even though Mr. Jones
had no criminal record or drugs on his person); Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 8 (discussing Charles
Clark's life savings-SI 1,000-which was seized in the Cincinnati airport, after officers claimed Mr.
Clark "smelled of marijuana"); Stillman, supra note I (describing a police practice where cops stopped
people for minor violations, asked about and seized the cash they had, while threatening serious penalties
if individuals did not waive the right to contest the forfeiture).
35 See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 443 (1996) (upholding the forfeiture of a family
vehicle after Mr. Bennis used it to engage in prostitution, even though it deprived Mrs. Bennis, a joint-
owner with no knowledge or role in the illegal conduct, her interest in the property); H.R. REP. NO. 106-
192, at 8-9 (1999) (describing the case of Billy Munnerlyn, whose charter plane was seized due to it being
used to unknowingly transport a person with drug money, and the legal battle forcing him into
bankruptcy); Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Government Seizures Victimize Innocent, Prr.
PRESS (Feb. 27, 1991), http://www.fear.org/guiltyl .html (telling the story of the Lopes family, whose
home was seized through forfeiture after their mentally challenged son planted a marijuana plant in the
yard and threatened suicide if his parents removed it).
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3. Legitimate Uses for Civil Forfeiture
Amidst the popular denunciation of civil asset forfeitures, it may be
difficult to discern the legitimate role for such seizures in law enforcement
practice. Again, the justifications for it, coming from law enforcement, often
come across as disingenuous. Yet there are compelling arguments that can
be made for keeping the procedure.
a. When the Criminal Is (for All Practical Purposes) Beyond
the Reach of the Law
International drug conspiracies are often directed by kingpins located
outside the United States.36 It may be impossible, in these situations, to make
arrests and carry out prosecutions of such individuals. Nonetheless, the
equipment they use to distribute drugs and the proceeds of their drug
transactions may be, at times, within easy reach of American law
enforcement personnel.
In these circumstances, civil asset forfeiture allows law enforcement o
dismantle the drug operation going on in the United States, even if they
cannot reach those ultimately responsible for the operation."7 To suggest hat
the property should be seized only if and after the individuals responsible are
captured, prosecuted, and convicted is to deprive local law enforcement of
its primary weapon against the absentee drug distributer.
b. When the Criminal Is Unknown but the Crime Is Obvious
In other circumstances, there may be ample evidence that a crime has
been committed but reasonable doubt about who is responsible. If police
uncover a methamphetamine lab in a previously abandoned warehouse
property, it may be very difficult for police to find and prosecute the persons
responsible. But it is also hard to articulate a reason police should not be able
to seize the lab equipment itself; there is no question that the lab has been
used (and may yet be used) to manufacture methamphetamine, despite the
police's inability to identify or pin a criminal conviction on any particular
suspect.
36 See Roger McDonough, Collaring Drug Kingpins: International Extradition and Continuing
Criminal Enterprise in United States v. Levy, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. 127, 127 (1992).
37 Cf Stefan D. Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States, 55 U.S. ATT'ys
BULL. 8, 8, 11 (2007) (discussing how civil asset forfeiture allows law enforcement to "remove the tools
of the crime from circulation," including guns, planes and cars used for drug smuggling and all real or
personal property used to commit or facilitate the commission of drug offenses).
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c. When the Assets Seized Are Contraband, or Otherwise
Valuable Only for Illegal Purposes
The state has a legitimate interest in removing contraband from
circulation.38 Adulterated food, obscene material, and the raw materials
uniquely useful for building nuclear weapons, for example, serve no
legitimate or defensible purpose for a law-abiding citizen. These things
should certainly be seized, regardless of whether anyone can be shown to
have committed a crime in their acquisition or use.
Dee Edgeworth, an expert on civil asset forfeiture with the Department
of Justice ("DOJ"), has offered other compelling examples in which assets
are uniquely designed to facilitate crime.
[I] What would you do with a house that was modified to cultivate indoor marijuana?
Thousands of plants, and finished marijuana are found within the premises. Every room is
filled with marijuana plants, grow lights, and vents. No one lives at the house. The entire house
is an indoor marijuana grow house. There is a tunnel that leads from under the house where
the growers take the trash and dispose of the refuse in a public area. The windows are covered.
The house was purchased with legitimate funds [but] the absentee owner is knowingly
allowing the premises to be used to cultivate marijuana. The house is not contraband. No
proceeds were used to purchase the property. Neighbors complain that the house is an eyesore
and is depreciating property values.
[2] Officers make a valid traffic stop on a vehicle and obtain consent to search the vehicle.
They find a concealed compartment that has been specifically built into the vehicle which
contains a large quantity of drugs. The registered owner is a "mule" who admits driving drugs
from Mexico to the US and takes currency back to Mexico inside the concealed compartment.
The vehicle makes regular runs between Mexico and the US. CBP [U.S. Customs and Border
Protection] documents numerous entries by this vehicle into the US over the past six months.
The vehicle is not contraband. There is no evidence that the vehicle was purchased with drug
proceeds.
39
In both of these circumstances, there is a compelling case for allowing
the forfeiture of the property to combat vice. In both cases, it appears likely
that the assets-unless eized-will be used to facilitate future criminal
activity. However, it may be difficult to craft a legal reform that allows
seizures of these assets but does not also open the door to the kind of
overreach that has galvanized public opposition to the practice.
38 See Nat'l Conf. of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Controlled Substances Act




39 Pimentel, supra note 4, at 51 n.295 (quoting E-mail from Dee Edgeworth, Attorney-Advisor,
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, U.S. Dcp't of Justice, to David Pirentel (Feb. 22, 2012,
4:12 PM) (on file with George Mason Law Review)).
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B. How Does Civil Asset Forfeiture Work in Practice?
A civil forfeiture is always precipitated by criminal activity.40 It is the
crime that justifies the seizure of property connected in some way to that
crime.41 Accordingly, it is law enforcement officials, investigating suspected
crime, who typically act to seize the property in question. But they need not
make an arrest before seizing the property.42 Moreover, they can typically
pursue the forfeiture as a civil proceeding even if there is never an arrest or
prosecution for the underlying crime.43
1. Equitable Sharing
Every state has its own rules and procedures for seizing assets it deems
forfeitable.44 However, one of the most popular methods for forfeiting
property, even for local law enforcement, is to invoke federal procedure.
Because federal procedures are reasonably straightforward4 and uniform
throughout the country, it is relatively easy for law enforcement to seize
property under color of federal law, turning it over to federal authorities to
carry out the forfeiture according to the federal procedures. The DOJ has
actively encouraged this practice with a program called "equitable sharing,"
which allows it to kick back a large percentage of the seized assets to the
local law enforcement agency that seized the assets in the first place." The
result is a win-win for both local and federal law enforcement: the local
authorities can seize the assets easily, without having to comply with state
40 Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 8 (describing civil forfeiture as a mechanism to allow the
government o seize and keep property suspected ofbeing connected to a crime).
41 Dery, supra note 18, at 3 ("Since the forfeiture action is against the property and not the
defendant, it is limited to property that is traceable to the offense, that facilitated the offense, or that was
involved in moncy laundering.").
42 Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 8 (explaining that the government proceeds against property,
instead of the person, during civil forfciture and that "civil forfeiturc allows law enforcement to take
property from innocent people who have never been formally accused of a crime, let alone convicted of
one').
43 Craig Gaumer, A Prosecutor's Secret Weapon: Federal Civil Forfeiture Law, 55 U.S. ATT'YS
BULL 59, 63 (2007) (discussing that civil forfeiture is independent of criminal cases, thus the government
can file thc action "before indictment, after indictment, or even if there is no indictment"); see also United
States v. 3120 Banneker Drivc, 691 F. Supp. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1988) ("A property is subject to civil
forfeiture even it its owner is acquitted of--or never called to defend against-criminal charges.").
44 Cf Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 22 tbl. I (grading the civil asset forfeiture laws of each state
based on the state's financial incentive to seize property, the government's standard of proof, and the
burden in innocent owner claims).
45 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012 & Supp. IH 2016) (setting forth the procedures for a civil
asset forfeiture).
46 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE To EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afnls/file/794696/download.
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law and procedure, and the federal authorities get a percentage of the take
without having to expend their own resources to carry out the seizure.
41
Equitable sharing happens in two ways. First, it can arise in the context
ofjoint and cooperative efforts between state and federal authorities.
4H When
a joint task force seizes assets, equitable sharing allows the federal authorities
to share the wealth with state and local authorities that assisted in the
operation.49 Equitable sharing, however, also contemplates "adoptions," in
which property seized by state authorities, acting alone, is handed over to
federal authorities for purposes of perfecting the forfeiture under federal
law.se The future of the equitable sharing program was cast in doubt in 2015,
when Attorney General Eric Holder announced a suspension of portions of
the equitable sharing program,5 but his successor, Loretta Lynch, reinstated
the program the following year.52
2. Burdens of Proof
Once property is seized, the burden is on the owner of the seized
property to contest the forfeiture.53 If the owner does not step forward, the
property can be kept as an "administrative forfeiture" without any court
oversight and without anyone checking to see if law enforcement had a
legitimate basis for seizing the property in the first place. An estimated 80
47 See Drug Policy Alliance, Above the Law: An Investigation of CivilAsset Forfeiture in California
10,
https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Drug-Policy-Alliance-Above--theLaw-Civil-AssetLFor
feiture-inCalifornia.pdf (Apr. 20, 2015) (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (describing equitable sharing as a win-
win, in that it allows state and local authorities to seize what they wanted, while not costing the DOJ
money).
48 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 6.
49 See id. at 12 (discussing the allotment amount shared between federal and non-federal law
enforcement agencies, based on joint investigations for asset forfeiture).
50 Id. at 6.
51 See Robert O'Harrow Jr., Sar Horwitz, & Steven Rich, Holder Limits Seized-Asset Sharing





52 See Christopher Ingraham, The Feds Have Resumed a Controversial Program that Lets Cops
Take Stuffand Keep It, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.con/new/wonk
/wp/2016/03/28/the-feds-have-resumed-a-controversial-program-that-lets-cops-take-stuf-and-keep-
it/?utm_term=.73ba4ed03130.
53 See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 1I.
54 See id. at 12-13 (explaining that when a person does not challenge a seizure, it becomes an
administrative forfeiture with no judicial involvement, leaving the seizing agency to decide if the seizure
was warranted).
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percent to 88 percent of forfeitures, at least in the federal system, are
uncontested.55
Civil forfeitures do not require a criminal conviction, or even an arrest.56
Historically, the property can be seized on no more than probable cause to
believe that a crime has occurred and that the property was connected to the
crime somehow."7 The action is brought in rem with the property itself as the
named defendant. Historically, if the property was guilty, it never mattered
whether the owner was innocent: the property could be forfeited anyway. 58
For example, if a car thief stole a car, and then used the car to transport illegal
drugs, the car would be deemed guilty and could be forfeited. If trespassers
ran an illegal gambling operation in a commercial garage,59 the real property
55 See id. at 5 (giving the 88 percent figure); Stefan D. Cassella, The Casefor Civil Forfeiture: Why
In Rem Proceedings Are an Essential Tool for Recovering the Proceeds of Crime, 11 J. MONEY
LAUNDERING CONTROL 8, 10 (2008), (giving the 80 percent figure); Pimentel, supra note 4, at 27-31
(2012) (discussing possible reasons for uncontested forfeitures rising above 80 percent, including
difficulty in providing notice, costs of legal counsel, the burden of proof on innocent owners, a reluctance
to incriminate themselves or others in criminal activity, and the possibility of compromising one's rights
against self-incrimination). Why so many are uncontested is not entirely clear. Sometimes, no doubt, it is
impossible to give proper notice to the actual owner of the seized property, if the owner cannot be
identified readily. The expense of hiring counsel to contest the forfeiture will prompt owners to abandon
even meritorious claims, especially if the amount of the forfeiture is relatively small. DOJ representatives
tout the high rate of uncontested forfeitures as evidence that they are justified, as if no meaningful defense
against the forfeitures could be made. But historically, the burden of proof was on the claimant; even
under new rules designed to protect "innocent owners," the owner has the burden of proving her
innocence. It is also likely that property owners are reluctant to step forward because they do not want to
implicate themselves or their friends, family, or associates in alleged criminal activity, or waive their own
Fifth Amendment rights by voluntarily testifying about their relationship to the property in question,
property that someone suspects of being involved in criminal activity. Law enforcement is able to extort
such property-which may or may not be legally forfeitable-from parties who fear criminal prosecution
will follow if they object to the seizure. In the alternative, law enforcement can use the threat of forfeiture
to extort a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights.
56 See Gaumer, supra note 43 (discussing that civil forfeiture is independent of criminal cases, thus
the government can file the action "before indictment, after indictment, or even if there is no indictment");
see also United States v. 3120 Banneker Drive, 691 F. Supp. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1988) ("[A] property is
subject to civil forfeiture even if its owner is acquitted of--or never called to defend against-criminal
charges.").
57 See United States v. Brock, 747 F.2d 761, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing that the government
only needed to show probable cause that the property in dispute was connected to the criminal violation);
Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 11 ("In mostjurisdictions and for most types of property, all police need
to seize is 'probable cause' to believe that the cash, car or other property is connected to a crime that
permits civil forfeiture.").
58 But see 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2012 & Supp 1112016) (setting forth a federal innocent owner defense
for those who have committed no crime); Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 20 fig. 8 (showing which party
has the burden in each state for innocent owner defenses).
59 Damon Runyon's musical Guys and Dolls depicts Nathan Detroit's illegal craps game as "the
oldest established permanent floating crap game in New York." See Frank Loesser, The Oldest
Established, in GuyS AND DoLts Act 1, Scene 1 (Jo Swerling and Abe Burrows 1950),
http://guysdolls.weebly.com/uploads/5/4/7/5747752/full-script.l-.pdf. A major plot point involved
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could be forfeited, even if the owner of the garage was entirely unaware of
the trespassers and of their illegal use of her property.
C. Federal Reforms: The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
Concern about how civil forfeitures were running roughshod over
property rights prompted Congress to undertake an overhaul of federal
forfeiture procedure in the 1990s, resulting eventually in the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act ("CAFRA"), which became law with overwhelming
bipartisan support in 2000.60 Unfortunately, to obtain that bipartisan support,
in an election year no less, the bill's supporters had to water it down
considerably, and what was ultimately passed provided only a modest check
on law enforcement's use of this tool.
61
A more thorough analysis of CAFRA's provisions, and why they have
failed to solve the underlying problems, has been laid out elsewhere.
62 Key
provisions of CAFRA include, inter alia, the following: (1) a shift of the
burden of proof to the government to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the property is forfeitable (a burden that, in practice, it bears
only in the 12-20 percent of cases that are actually contested);
63 (2) the
creation of an "innocent owner" defense to a forfeiture (but the burden of
proving innocence still lies with the claimant);6 (3) the provision of counsel
in limited circumstances (when already represented by state-appointed
counsel in the criminal case, or if the asset at issue is the claimant's
residence);65 (4) a "hardship" provision that may allow, based on a balancing
of the equities, the claimant to retain custody of property pending a final
adjudication of the forfeiture;" (5) compensation for damage done to the
finding a location for the game-the song lyrics extol his prowess in this regard: "If you're looking for
action, he'll furnish the spot, even when the heat is on it's never too hot." Nathan ultimately held his game
at the Biltmore Garage, and if Lt. Brannigan had succeeded in busting up the game, it appears that he
could have seized the Biltmore Garage in a civil forfeiture. Id.
60 In fact, the Senate Committee approved CAFRA unanimously, something that was considered
essential since 2000 was an election year. See David B. Smith, An Insider's View of the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of2000, 24 CHAMPION 28, 28 (2000).
61 See id. at 28-29.
62 See Pimentel, supra note 4, at 3-4 (discussing the problems and injustices inherent in the arcane
forfeiture procedure).
63 See Eric Moores, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51 ARuz. L. REv. 777, 798
(2009).
64 SeeH.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1,at31 (1997).
65 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(l)(A), (2)(A) (2012 & Supp. 1 2016); H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 14
(1999); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1, at 29 (1997) ("rhis Committee believes that given the
punitive, quasi-criminal nature of civil forfeiture proceedings, legal representation should be provided for
those who are indigent in appropriate circumstance.").
66 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1, at 29.
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property while in the government's possession;6 7 (6) elimination of the
requirement that the claimant post a "cost bond" when contesting a
forfeiture;61 and (7) a requirement that there be a "substantial connection"
between the crime and the property seized.9
D. State Reforms
Not surprisingly, a variety of states have attempted to crack down on
law enforcement's overreaching with forfeitures. New Mexico was
embarrassed by the Las Cruces City Attorney's boasts, made "with an
amiable bemusement hat bordered on glee" and later made public, about
how they can enrich the municipalities by raising their sights from just
seizing vehicles to seizing real property: "We could be czars. We could own
the city. We could be in the real estate business.' 70 The state legislature,
embarrassed, and undoubtedly encouraged by expressions of outrage from
its constituents, responded by passing legislation that purported to ban civil
forfeitures altogether.71
Several other states and the District of Columbia have adopted new
reforms in the past few years, aimed at curtailing the use, or at least the abuse,
of civil forfeitures.72 As many of these bills are very new, it is too early to
draw final conclusions on their effectiveness in curbing the problems they
purport to address. Early indications suggest, however, that many of these
state reforms overall will have-like CAFRA-only limited impact. Indeed,
the financial incentives behind civil forfeitures continue to inspire law
enforcement o oppose beforehand, and to circumvent afterward, the states'
attempts to rein them 732
67 See id. at 33.
68 Seeid. at34.
69 See Pimentel, supra note 4, at 20-21.
70 Rob Nikolewsid, A 'GoldMine'or a Civil Liberties Outrage? Civil Forfeiture Remarks Go Viral,
WATCHDOG (Nov. 13, 2014), http://watchdog.org/l82915/gold-mine-forfeiture/.
71 Nonetheless, it appears that law enforcement has found ways around the legislative ban, and is
carrying out forfeitures anyway. See Martin Kaste, New Mexico Ended Civil Asset Forfeiture. Why Then
Is It Still Happening?, NPR (June7, 2016, 5:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/06/07/481058641/new-
mexico-ended-civii-asset-forfeiture-why-then-is-it-still-happening; see also discussion infra Section
II.A.2.
72 See, e.g., Jo Ingles, Ohio's Civil Asset Forfeiture Bill Signed into Law, STATEHOUSE NEWS
BUREAU (Jan. 5, 2017) http://statenews.org/post/ohios-civil-asset-forfeituwe-bill-signedlaw; Nick Sibilla,
Washington, D.C Council Votes to Reform City's Civil Forfeiture Law, Ban Policing Profit, FORBES
(Dec. 3, 2014, 1:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/institutefojustice/2014/12/03/washington-d-c-
c0uncil-votes-to-reform-citys-civil-forfeiture-laws-an-p ng-for-pro t/#45O; Nick Wing,
Montana Governor Signs Law to Protect Innocent People from Having Their Property Seized by Police,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2015, 2:37 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.comx2015/05/06/niontana-civil-
asset-forfeiture n_7222258.htm.
73 See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 28.
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A more thorough analysis of states' possible approaches to scaling back
civil forfeitures is needed, to guide those state legislatures that want
meaningful reform and, perhaps, to expose those legislatures with toothless
reform agendas that nonetheless want to take credit for addressing the
problem. At the same time, as long as the system preserves law
enforcement's financial stake in civil forfeitures, any attempt at reform will
be actively opposed, undermined, and even circumvented by the very
agencies entrusted with implementing it.
II. APPROACHES TO STATE-BASED REFORM
Several reforms have been proposed and adopted in various states, all
of which sound good in principle, and each of which reflects good intentions
and motivation to address the problems cited above. They appear to be aimed
at curbing abuse of forfeitures and better protecting the rights of property
owners.74 Examination of the various approaches taken will reveal some
common pitfalls in the reform efforts while highlighting the provisions more
likely to produce meaningful results.
A- Elimination of Civil Forfeiture Altogether
One approach is to eliminate civil forfeiture altogether.
75 The basic idea
is to remove civil forfeiture from law enforcement's toolbox, leaving
criminal forfeiture intact. Again, that would shift the focus to the culpability
of the owner and allow the forfeiture of his or her property-in an in
personam action aimed at punishing the offender-only if the owner is
actually convicted of the crime, by a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard,
affording the claimant the full phalanx of Fourth (search and seizure), Fifth
(due process), and Sixth (right to counsel) Amendment rights.
74 See Nick Wing. More Than a Dozen States Are Trying to Stop Cops from Taking Innocent
People's Stuff, HUFFINOTON POST (Feb. 7, 2017, 2:17 PM), https://www.huffngtopost.comlentry/state-
civil-asset-forfeiture-reform_us._5899d2lbe4bG9bd304bd7
3dc.
75 See 2016 Wyo. Sess. Laws 1-8 (codified and amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. §35-7-1049 (West
2017)); see also 2015 Mont. Laws 1926-36 (codified and amended at MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-103
(West 2017)).
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1. States Cannot Stop Federal Civil Forfeitures, Leaving the Door
Open for Their Law Enforcement Officials to Conduct
Forfeitures Under Federal Law
The simplicity of this approach is deceptive. The problem is that law
enforcement may or may not be operating under state law authorizations.
Rescinding those authorizations, therefore, can only do so much.
For example, there are broad authorizations for civil forfeitures under
federal law, most notably drug laws but in-at one count-almost two
hundred other federal statutes.76 There is no reason that local law enforcement
couldn't operate under color of federal law, seizing property as authorized by
federal law when conducting investigations of federal crimes, even if state
law does not separately authorize the seizures. Indeed, the DOJ has strongly
encouraged local and state authorities to execute such seizures with its
equitable sharing program.
The state of Montana earned plaudits for its civil asset forfeiture reform
legislation in 2015,71 but that new law fails to place any restriction on
participation in DOJ's equitable sharing program.78 Accordingly, forfeitures
continue apace there under federal law, and law enforcement agencies in
Montana continue to reap the rewards of such seizures.79
2. States May Eliminate State-Law Civil Forfeitures but Leave the
Door Open to Forfeitures Under Local Law
At the same time, some local law enforcement agencies have claimed
authorization under municipal ordinances to carry out forfeitures, even where
state law does not authorize them.80 New Mexico's forfeiture reform law is
arguably the strongest and most sweeping of the reforms undertaken in any
state,"1 yet vehicle seizures continue in both Albuquerque and Santa Fe.Y
76 See Pimentel, supra note 20, at 18-19.
77 See, eg., Nick Sibilla, Civil Forfeiture Now Requires a Criminal Conviction in Montana and
New Mexico, FORBES (July 2, 2015), http://www.forbescom/sites/instituteforjustice/2015/07/02/civil-
forfeiture-now-reqnires-a-ciaal-conviction-in-montana-and-new_ mexico/#4e6551206a48; Wing,
supra note 72.
78 See Sam Gedge, Montana Must Do More to Reform Civil Forfeiture Law, BILLINGS GAZETTE
(Nov. 16, 2015), http://billingsgazette.con/news/opinion/guest/mintana-must-do-more-to-rform-civil-
forfeiture-law/article fd0c3785-2b9c-5892-a2d5-Obc6acl98fb9.html.
79 See discussion infra Section II.B.
80 See Anne Constable, Civil Forfeiture Ongoing Despite Change to State Law, SANTA FE NEW
MEXICAN (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.santafenewmexican.connews/local-news/civil-forfeiture-
ongoing-despite-change-to-state-law/article bbc6c721 -bI ff-5438-b735-65d533fd3706.html.
81 See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 3.
82 See Constable, supra note 80.
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Those seizures have been challenged in court, and the outcome may
require a careful parsing of the statute, but a key case challenging the
practice-brought by two state legislators, aggrieved that the statute they had
passed was being ignored-was dismissed for lack of standing.
3 A second
case challenging the practice prompted the voluntary return of the vehicle in
question, but the city explained its decision to drop the case by conceding
that the vehicle was seized outside city limits, and therefore beyond its
jurisdiction.8 Skeptics have viewed this action as strategic, to avoid a ruling
on their authority to seize vehicles at all.85 In the meantime, forfeitures-at
least of vehicles--continue in the capital, and in the largest city, of a state
that attempted, and purported, to eliminate them entirely.
6
3. Eliminating Civil Forfeiture" Cannot Extinguish All Civil
Aspects to the Forfeiture Proceeding
New Mexico's new law does eliminate the power, under state law, to
seize property without criminal process.7 In this sense, they have eliminated
civil forfeiture. But what happens under New Mexico's new legislation still
contains elements of civil process, particularly when the person charged with
and convicted of the crime is not the owner of the property.88
The new procedure awaits the conclusion of the criminal trial.
89 Only
after the trial concludes with a conviction can the forfeiture proceeding occur,
and it does so before the same jury that decided the criminal case.90 In the
latter hearing, the government must prove a nexus between the property and
the crime that was committed, and they must show that nexus by clear and
convincing evidence,9' a standard lower than the "beyond a reasonable
83 See Ryan Boetel, Judge Throws Out Challenge to DWI Seizure Program, ALBUQUERQUE J. (May
20, 2016), https://www.abqjournal.com/777339/udge-thrws-out-chalIenge-to-dwi-scizure-program
.html.
84 See Melissa Quinn, She Got the Car the Government Seized Back But Her Fight isn 't Over,
DAILY SIGNAL (Jan. 3, 2017), http://dailysignal.com/2017/01/03/she-got-he-car-the-government-sized-
back-but-her-fight-isnt-over/.
85 Id.
86 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4(A)(3) (2017). Such problems can be dealt with through careful
drafting of the statute intended to eliminate or curtail civil forfeitures, of course. The state statute can
explicitly deprive municipalities of the power to pass contrary legislation. See discussion infra Section
II.C.
87 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4(A).
88 See id. § 31-27-6(F).
89 See id. § 31-27-6(C).
90 See id.
91 See id. § 30-31-34; Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 108 ("It must then tic the property to that
crime with clear and convincing evidence in criminal court."). The New Mexico statute also protects
innocent owners by requiring that the state to prove that the owner of the property had actual knowledge
of the criminal use of the property, and was not a bona fide purchaser. N.M. STAT. § 31-27-7.1(F).
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doubt" standard that applies to the criminal conviction, but higher than the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard that applies in a typical civil case.92
Other than the lower standard of proof, the forfeiture hearing will be
carried out in a manner that reflects a criminal proceeding, at least when the
owner of the property is the person convicted of the crime.9a The defendant
presumably enjoys many of the procedural protections she did in a criminal
proceeding, as she will have the assistance of counsel, will get a jury trial,
and will enjoy a legal presumption in her favor that the government must
overcome by meeting its burden of proof.94
If, however, the property at issue does not belong to the defendant, the
proceeding with respect to the owner resumes the character of a civil
proceeding.91 The owner of the property, in this case, has not been a party to
the criminal trial and must make an appearance after the verdict, if he or she
hopes to contest the forfeiture.96 The jury will decide whether the property is
sufficiently connected to the crime to make it subject to forfeiture,91 and
whether the owner of the property "had actual knowledge" of the crime
giving rise to the forfeiture,91 and will allow the forfeiture only if both
elements are met.
If the owner was aware of the crime, and his property was used to
facilitate the crime, then that guilt is sufficient to support the forfeiture.99
Awareness of another's criminal behavior is not normally sufficient to
support criminal sanctions or punishment,oo and the owner escapes the
proceeding without a criminal record. But even under New Mexico's
sweeping forfeiture reform, the owner who did nothing wrong, but was
merely aware of the crime being committed on or with his property, can be
92 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4(A)(3) (2017). Florida has actually adopted the higher standard
ofproof of beyond a reasonable doubt standard in establishing that the crime was committed and the nexus
between the crime and the property sought be seized. See FLA. STAT. § 932.704(8) (2017) ("Upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the contraband article was being used in violation of the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act, the court shall order the seized property forfeited to the seizing law
enforcement agency.").
93 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-6(C)-(D).
94 Seeid.
95 SeeMi. § 31-21-7. 1.
96 See id.
97 See id. §§ 31-27-4(8), 31-27-6. In a forfeiture proceeding the right to ajury trial only exists when
the property being seized is valued over $20,000; however, the discovery rules are still governed by the
rules of criminal procedure for the state. See id. § 31-27-6(C)E).
98 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-7.1(F).
99 Id.
100 Even the flexible crime of conspiracy requires more than awareness; the defendant must have
agreed to the commission of the crime before he can be punished for conspiracy. See United States v.
Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199, 1212 (9th Cir. 2016) ("To prove a conspiracy... the government must establish-
'(1) an agreement to engage in criminal activity, (2) one or more overt acts taken to implement the
agreement, and (3) the requisite intent to commit the substantive crimc."' (quoting United States v.
Sullivan, 522 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir. 2008))).
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punished by the loss of that property.'0, And while the owner can hire counsel
if he can afford it,102 he has no right-as he would if he were a criminal
defendant-to court-appointed counsel to defend his interests. 
03 Again, this
gives the proceeding a civil character.
B. Prohibiting or Limiting Participation in Federal Forfeiture
Operations
Because federal forfeiture procedure remains generous to law
enforcement, even post-CAFRA, a restriction on state-law-based forfeitures
runs the risk of simply channeling the forfeitures onto the federal track,
without meaningful abatement of the offensive law enforcement practices. It
is not enough to trust the goodwill of local law enforcement; the financial
incentives to continue with the forfeitures are too compelling. As already
noted, the effectiveness of Montana's civil asset forfeiture reform is in doubt
precisely because it failed to close this door. 104
These incentives are not necessarily rooted in greed, despite the
unfortunate appearances created in Las Cruces. 15 In some ways, however,
the financial imperative is far more compelling than greed-based excesses,
as it relates to maintaining adequate funding for basic operations. All these
agencies face budget limitations, and if they, or their funders, have come to
rely on forfeitures as a regular revenue source, cutting off that cash flow
could be painful, if not crippling, for the law enforcement agencies
involved. 106
In any case, if the equitable sharing remains available as a source of
much-needed funds, it will be very difficult to shut off that tap without
explicit language in state legislation prohibiting such participation. The
states, of course, have no power to supersede a federal statute that authorizes
civil forfeiture, and need to continue-under principles of federalism and
101 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-7.](F)(1).
102 A court may order the return of enough of the seized funds to enable the claimant to hire counsel,
however. See id. § 31-27-4.1(F). Also, a public defender may represent the defendant at a forfeiture
proceeding related to the criminal offence. See id. § 31-27-6(C) ("If the criminal defendant in the related
criminal matter is represented by the public defender department, the chief public defender or the district
public defender may authorize department representation of the defendant in the forfeiture proceeding.").
103 Compare id. § 31-27-4.1(F) (granting owners the potential to receive funds to obtain counsel),
with id. § 31-27-6(C) (granting the criminal defendant the potential court-appointed counsel).
104 See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
105 See Nikolewski, supra note 70. The "we could be czars' comment was very bad publicity, but a
flippant remark, even done in an effort to be humorous, should not be mistaken for the true motives.
106 See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 2 ("[W]hcn the recession hit in the late 2000s, and
governments at all levels faced significant budgetary shortfalls, law enforcement agencies had even more
of an incentive to raise revenue through forfeiture."); id. at 29 ("[C]ities' equitable sharing payments had
increased dramatically following cuts to police budgets.").
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comity-to cooperate in joint federal-state law enforcement ask forces and
initiatives, some of which will result in federal forfeitures.107 State law
enforcement should not be permitted, much less compelled by state law, to
act in a way that obstructs or frustrates federal authorities in carrying out their
own mandate. State cooperation with federal authorities is important, and
forfeiture reform should not be permitted to abrade that relationship.
While state law enforcement needs to cooperate with federal authorities
in crime-fighting enterprises, which may or may not generate forfeitures
permitted by federal law, the states can prohibit state and local law
enforcement from participating in the spoils of the forfeiture operations.' 08
The upshot is that although a state statute could never bar federal law
enforcement authorities (the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives; etc.) from carrying out civil forfeitures authorized under federal
law, it could prevent local authorities from taking the kickback the federal
equitable sharing program otherwise provides.10 9
1. Limitations on Equitable Sharing
a. Barring Participation in Equitable Sharing Completely
The District of Columbia's statute requires that all proceeds of
forfeitures go into the city's general fund," 0 which violates the terms of the
DOJ's equitable sharing program."' The DOJ will share the seized assets
only if those assets go back to law enforcement, and the District of
Columbia's statute prohibits that, rendering it ineligible for participation in
107 See Michael J. Dufly, A Drug War Funded with Drug Money: The Federal Civil Forfeiture
Statute and Federalism, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 511, 533-34 (2001).
108 See discussion infra Section rl.C.
109 Many of the anecdotes about forfeiture abuse arise in the context of routine traffic stops, e.g.,
Terry-stops, when law enforcement officers can use just about any suspicious circumstance-including
the fact that the individual stopped is carrying a large amount of cash-as an excuse to seize the property.
Federal agents typically do not engage in this type of policing, and will be in a position to seize property
only in less-common scenarios, such as big drug busts.
110 D.C. CODE § 41-310 (2017). The redirecting of forfeiture proceeds to the general fund goes a
long way toward removing financial incentives for law enforcement agencies to overreach or abuse
forfeitures. See discussion Infra Section lI.D.
III See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERIM POuCY GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF EQUITABLE
SHARING FUNDS 2 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/rininal-afmlslegacy/2014/07131/
Use-ofShared-Funds-Policy-2014.pdf ("[E]quitably shared funds shall be used by law enforcement
agencies for law enforcement purposes only."). Exceptions to this policy include providing budgetary
support for community-based programs, such as drug treatment facilities, jobs skills programs, and crime
prevention education. See 14. at 2-5.
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equitable sharing altogether.11 To date, no state has been willing to go that
far, but the District of Columbia's uncompromising, "no exceptions"
approach has the advantage of avoiding the problem of the camel's nose or,
alternatively stated, of the slippery slope. 
113
Of course, this is a weak bar to participation, as the DOJ could simply
alter its own policy for equitable sharing, and the door would open again. The
effectiveness of the District of Columbia's statutory bar on participation in
equitable sharing is dependent on the DOJ maintaining the current
parameters for such participation.
b. Dollar-Value Thresholds
Most states that have attempted to curtail participation in equitable
sharing have stopped short of cutting it off entirely. The most common
approach is to place a dollar threshold on seizures, allowing equitable sharing
of the seized assets only if they exceed a statutory minimum. For example,
Nebraska allows it for seizures over $25,000, 11 Maryland and New Mexico
for seizures over $50,000,I 11 and Ohio for seizures over $ 100,000.116
In these states, participation in equitable sharing is permitted when the
seizure is large enough, and on one level, this makes sense. There can be no
question that some of the most problematic abuses of forfeiture procedure lie
with low-value seizures (cash amounts in the hundreds, or in the low
thousands), which go uncontested because it costs more to challenge the
forfeiture than to surrender the assets."7 Some of the worst horror stories
about forfeiture abuse come from police practices and policies-like those of
112 See Jason Snead, An Overview ofRecent State-Level Forfeiture Reforms, BACKGROUNDER (Aug.
23, 2016), http://www.hertage.org/crime-and-justicereport/overview-recent-sateure-
reforms ("[Tlhc City Council directed that District law enforcement agencies deposit federal equitable
sharing payments into the city's general fund beginning on October 1,2018. This mandate runs directly
afoul of equitable sharing rules that require money be retained and spent only by a law enforcement
agency. It is expected that the move will force an end to property transfers at that time.").
113 The powerful financial incentives for law enforcement to continue their equitable sharing
operations make the threat of the camel's nose particularly potent. See discussion infra Section ll.D. The
"camel's nose" refers to "[a] small, seemingly innocuous act or decision that will lead to much larger,
more serious, and less desirable consequences down the line. The term refers to an alleged Arab proverb
that if a camel is allowed to get its nose inside of a tent, it will be inpossible to prevent the rest of it from
entering." A Camel's Nose (Under the Tent), FREE DICrIONARY,
http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/a+camels+nose+(under+the+tent) (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
114 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1603 (2017).
115 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 12-212 (West 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-11I(A)(l) (2017).
116 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.14(B) (West 2017).
117 See Michael van den Berg, Proposing a Transaction Approach to Civil Forfeiture Reform, 163
U. PA. L. REV. 867, 871 (2015) (arguing that increasing the state's transaction costs for forfeitures will
rein in these abuses because it won't be worth it to pursue assets of modest value).
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Tenaha, Texas--of seizing relatively small amounts of cash on flimsy
grounds, trusting that the seizure is unlikely to face any legal challenge. II
However, high-value forfeitures may be problematic as well. In
particular, the prospect of a large jackpot-landing an especially lucrative
forfeiture-may create incentives that are too hard to resist, even when
justice and equity suggest a more tempered approach. Worse, these
thresholds could produce the opposite effect, encouraging law enforcement
to seize far more than they otherwise would-no longer content to seize the
cash, since they can't keep such a small amount, they may try to seize the car
and the real property as well-as they try to make sure they seize enough to
meet or clear the statutory minimal dollar threshold.
c. Exceptions for Federal Actions
Of the few jurisdictions that limit participation in equitable sharing,
most have carved out exceptions to permit cooperation and support of federal
law enforcement efforts." 9 The New Mexico law, for example, permits the
transfer of seized assets to federal authorities not only if the $50,000
threshold is met, but also when (1) the underlying criminal conduct was
"interstate in nature and sufficiently complex to justify the transfer," or (2)
the property is forfeitable only under federal law. 120 But the New Mexico
statute also provides that even in these circumstances, transfer to federal
authorities is not permitted "if the transfer would circumvent the protections
of the Forfeiture Act that would otherwise be available to a putative interest
holder in the property."'' This provision betrays the caution with which New
Mexico approached its reform of forfeiture, undoubtedly aware that their
reform could easily be swallowed up by the exceptions, particularly those
allowing the state to piggyback on federal procedures.
Nebraska adopts a similar approach but with its own list of limitations.
Specifically, it allows state officials to participate in equitable sharing only
if the value threshold is met or if (1) a federal agent conducts the initial
seizure, or (2) the owner is the subject of a federal prosecution. 2 2
While federal-state cooperation is important, and while it may be
entirely appropriate to ensure that state authorities can hand seized assets
over to federal authorities, the policy basis for allowing state and local law
118 See Elora Mukherjee, Settlement Means No More Highway Robbery in Tenaha, Texas, ACLU
(Aug. 9, 2012, 11:22 AM), https://www.acu.org/blog/settlement-means-no-more-highway-robbery-
tenaha-texas; Stillnn, supra note 1.
119 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 12-212 (permitting under $50,000 if the seizing
authority transfers the property to a federal authority under a federal seizure warrant issued to take custody
of assets); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.14 (permitting under $100,000 if the property is being
transferred or referred to a federal criminal forfeiture proceeding).
120 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-1 1(A)(I)-(3) (emphasis added).
121 Id. § 31-27-11 (B).
122 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1603 (2017).
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enforcement to profit from that cooperation is far less compelling. It is to
those issues we turn next.
2. Redirecting the Kickback Received from the DOJ Under
Equitable Sharing
Where state law does allow participation in the equitable sharing
program, there is considerable risk that the negative effects of forfeiture will
be perpetuated, despite reform of state law. As long as state authorities can
profit from them, they are likely to prioritize such seizures at the expense of
other, perhaps less lucrative, law enforcement priorities. Why should police
utilize limited time and resources responding to a domestic violence call,
when there is so much money to be made chasing down, or shaking down,
suspected drug dealers who carry cash? And given the ease with which
forfeitures can be effected under federal law, leaving the door open to
equitable sharing will perpetuate the temptation to overreach and otherwise
abuse the procedure. Legislation that allows continued participation in
equitable sharing to any degree should, therefore, ensure that the proceeds of
such participation go somewhere other than back to the law enforcement
agency that carried out the seizure.
As noted above, the District of Columbia requires such funds to go into
the city's general fund, which effectively disqualifies it from taking equitable
sharing funds at all.'23 But a state could, presumably, if it believes it is
important to preserve some participation in equitable sharing, redirect the
shared assets to more general law enforcement funds,
124 or to specific
"education" or "rehabilitation" funds that are less likely to create pernicious
incentives for the officers or departments involved.
Presumably, the DOJ would like to compensate local law enforcement
for their outlays and investment in federal law enforcement priorities. They
may fear that state law enforcement will give federal initiatives low priority
if there is "nothing in it for them." But such fears do a great injustice to local
law enforcement, as they assume that absent a financial incentive, our peace
officers are not otherwise motivated to engage meaningfully in fighting
crime. And, as discussed infra Part ll.D, if we do build a system around
financial incentives, we can only distort the priorities of these same officers
and their departments.
123 D.C. CODE § 41-310(a)(2) (2017).
124 If, for example, the equitable sharing moneys went into a statewide fund that got spread over all
the city and county law enforcement agencies in the state, the payoff for any particular forfeiture would
be pretty low for the particular agency involved. This type of wealth-spreading might satisfy the DOJ's
equitable sharing rules without over-incentivizing any particular seizure.
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C. Superseding Local Ordinances
As already noted, one of the great lessons from New Mexico's statute
is that changing state law may not necessarily limit the reach of local
jurisdictions, including municipalities, to carry out civil forfeitures. 125 That
state's bold moves to walk back civil forfeitures have failed to curtail the
practice as intended, as local authorities claim that municipal ordinances
provide adequate authority for them to continue the practice. While these
claims have yet to be tested in court, 26 it should be simple enough for state
legislators to shut down this loophole in the text of the statute itself. But to
date, none have done so.
D. Ensuring That Law Enforcement Agencies Don 't Profit from
Forfeitures
Mentioned above in the context of equitable sharing, the point can and
should be generalized: assets seized, whether under federal or state law,
should not be channeled back to the agencies that carry out the seizures. If
local law enforcement can benefit from forfeitures, the incentives are
sufficiently powerful that they may threaten to undermine any and all other
reforms.
Ironically, the provisions for seizing the proceeds of crime-such as
those under RICO-have been justified as "taking the profit out of crime."' 2
Prosecutors have been quick to point out that deterring criminal behavior is
very difficult as long as such behavior is highly profitable. 28 DOJ officials
testified before Congress in 1997:
The attractiveness of asset forfeiture and a reason for its growth in the United States is very
simple: it takes the profit out of crime. Asset forfeiture is a program that cuts to the heart of
125 See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
126 The challenges that have been brought have been either dismissed for lack of standing or settled
short of a determination on the merits. See Boetel, supra note 83; Quinn, supra note 84.
127 See Douglas Leff, Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture: Taking the Profit out of Crime, 81
FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 23, 31 (2012).
128 See H.R. REP. No. 106-192, at 5 (1999) (statement of Stefan Cassella, Assistant Chief, Asset
Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice) ("The government.
. . uses forfeiture to take the profit out of crime .... Many criminals fear the loss of their vacation homes,
fancy cars, businesses and bloated bank accounts far more than the prospect of a jail sentence." (quoting
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 112 (1997))); see also LEVY, supra note 24, at 76 (1996) (noting that in passing the forfeiture
provisions in RICO, Congress was strongly motivated by its belief that they would "strike at the profits
of organized crime and wipe out its hold on legitimate organizations").
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most criminal activity, dismantling criminal syndicates in a way that simple incarceration
never could.1
29
Similar arguments were pitched to the previous Congress: "Many
criminals fear the loss of their vacation homes, fancy cars, businesses and
bloated bank accounts far more than the prospect of a jail sentence."
' 30 By
the same token, if we hope to contain overly aggressive law enforcement
agencies in their pursuit of forfeitures, it would be wise, perhaps necessary,
to take the profit out of forfeitures.
1. Where Should the Seized Assets Go?
If the seized assets do not go to the law enforcement agency that seized
them, where should they go? Various jurisdictions have taken different
approaches. Some-including the District of Columbia, New Mexico, and
New Hampshire-have provided that the seized assets should go into the
city's or state's general fund, rather than law enforcement's own coffers." I
North Carolina has not had serious problems with forfeitures under state
law,3 2 perhaps because its constitution provides that "[p]roceeds of all
penalties and forfeitures . . . [must] be faithfully appropriated and used
exclusively for maintaining free public schools."
33 It should not be surprising
that the problems North Carolina has experienced with civil forfeitures have
come not from state authorized procedure but from the invocation of federal
authority under the equitable sharing program. 134
Indiana's constitution similarly requires that seized assets be applied to
public schools but leaves a loophole that allows law enforcement to first
deduct their investigation costs before depositing the rest into the school
fund. '3 As a result, some local agencies have withheld most if not all the
assets seized;136 Marion County, the largest county in the state, reportedly has
129 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 1916,
104th Cong. 237 (1996) (statement of Jan P. Blanton, Director, Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture,
Dep't of Treasury).
130 H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1, at 23 (1997) (quoting Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 1916, 105th Cong. 112 (1997) (statement of Stefan
Cassella, Assistant Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Dcp't
of Justice)).
131 D.C. CODE § 41-310(aX2) (2017); N.H. REV STAT. § 318-B:17-b (2017); N.M. STAT. § 31-27-
7(b) (2017).
132 See Jon Guze, Good News on Civil Asset Forfeiture, CAROLINA J. (Jan. 27, 2015, 12:00 AM),
https://www.carolinajournal.cornm/topinion-article/good-news-n-civi-asset-forfeiture/.
133 N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7(a).
134 Guze, supra note 132.
135 IND. CONST. art. 8, § 2; IND. CODE § 34-6-2-73 (2017).
136 See, e.g., Pat Munsey, Prosecutor Sued over Forfeiture Practices, KOKOMO PERsP. (Dec. 2,
2010), http://kokomoperspective.co m/newstlocal-news/prosecutor- sued-over-forfeiture-
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exploited this loophole to keep all forfeiture proceeds in the hands of local
law enforcement. 1"
Some states designate specially identified repositories for the assets
seized, including special funds related to law enforcement, such as Idaho's
"drug and driving under the influence donation fund."'3 Maryland law
suggests that forfeiture revenues go into the general fund but then requires
that 20 percent of them be spent on drug abuse and treatment programs. 139
Nebraska allows seized assets to be kept for "official use"--specifically to
enforce their child pornography statute-but for no longer than one year.'4
Beyond that, proceeds from forfeiture are deposited with the county
treasurer, with half the funds going to the County Drug Law Enforcement
and Education Fund and the other half going to public schools. ,4,
To the extent that forfeitures can be used to cover investigation costs, or
go into special funds that support law enforcement in some way, this
approach still runs the risk of incentivizing police. Police and sheriffs'
departments may be highly motivated to get reimbursed for expensive cases
they have undertaken and be aggressive about seizing assets needed to cover
those costs. Moreover, to the extent that the surplus is put into "enforcement
donation funds," the law enforcement agency may still benefit indirectly
from the assets seized. Any contribution that eases budgetary pressures on
law enforcement (e.g., to include donation funds for the enforcement of DUI
or drug laws) may liberate other funds that the agency could spend on
competing priorities. In such circumstances, the seized assets remain "found
money."9
2. Taking the Profit out of Forfeitures Does Not Impair Their
Effectiveness
Of critical importance here is the fact that whatever legitimate law
enforcement purposes are served by civil forfeitures, they are in no way
undermined by this reform. Law enforcement will push back on most of the
proposed reforms, arguing that they need this tool-civil asset forfeiture-to
fight crime effectively. No doubt any reform that makes civil asset forfeiture
more difficult-whether imposing higher burdens of proof or taking away
practices/article 969e2ff2-fd8d-1l df-981f-00cc4c002e0.htm] ("The complaint states, 'Plaintiff alleges
that millions of dollars have been kept by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and private attorneys
hired by prosecutors to file civil forfeiture actions, money that was required to be paid into the
common school fund.").
137 -See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 16.
138 IDAHO CODE § 37-2744 (d)(3)(D)(IV)(iiX2)(C), (e)(2XC) (2017).
139 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 12-403, 405, 503 (2017).
140 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1439.02, 28-1601(5)(b) (2017).
141 Id. § 28-1439.02.
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the ability to just hand the assets to the federal authorities-will blunt the
instrument's impact in combatting crime.
The pushback against this reform-redirecting the seized assets-in
contrast, is not motivated by the need to preserve an officer's options when
performing an investigation or executing an arrest. Resistance to this reform
is purely mercenary. Police departments want to be able to keep this money
because they have come to depend on it and because they can use it for things
they could never spend their regular budget on. 42 Columbia, Missouri Police
Chief Kenneth M. Burton explained the expenditure of forfeiture funds this
way:
It's usually based on a need-well, I take that back. There's some limitations on it ....
Actually, there's not really on the forfeiture stuff. We just usually base it on something that
would be nice to have that we can't get in the budget, for instance. We try not to use it for
things that we need to depend on because we need to have those purchased. It's kind of like
pennies from heaven-it gets you a toy or something that you need is the way that we typically
look at it to be perfectly honest. 
143
No doubt this influx of resources is a boon to law enforcement and to
the quality of life for the officers in the trenches. But to the extent it
encourages police to overreach in seizing assets on questionable or marginal
grounds, it comes at a very heavy price in terms of the rule of law. Even the
distortion of departmental priorities in favor of maximizing assets seized is a
corruption of law enforcement's proper role. Even if police resist the
temptation to let the profit motive drive their policies and actions, the fact
that they do profit from the seizures sullies their image and reputation.
Redirecting those assets into the general fund, or to public schools, or to
anywhere else will remove the temptation while protecting law
enforcement's public image and inspiring the respect that necessarily
follows.
E. Requiring a Criminal Conviction
As discussed above, New Mexico claims credit for eliminating civil
forfeiture altogether,144 while it is clear that some civil aspects of the
procedure remain.45 The requirement of a criminal conviction before a civil
forfeiture can move forward, however, is a powerful check on a state's civil
forfeiture power. Yet it is important to avoid oversimplifying the issue,
because the person convicted of the crime is not necessarily the owner of the
seized property.
142 See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 15.
143 id.
'44 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-2(A)(6) (2017) ("The purposes of the Forfeiture Act are to... ensure
that only criminal forfeiture is allowed in this state.").
145 See discussion supra Section II.A.3.
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1. A Criminal Conviction of the Property Owner
One approach to forfeiture reform-adopted in Minnesota, 146
Montana,141 and Nebraska,--is to require that the property owner be
convicted of the crime before her property can be forfeited. 149This approach
tracks criminal forfeiture closely, where the forfeiture of assets becomes part
of the punishment for the crime, and is similar in thrust to the idea of
eliminating civil forfeitures altogether. It is an appealing approach, because
it forecloses the possibility that innocent people will lose their property to
forfeiture or that property will be seized without first affording the owner the
full array of procedural protections occasioned by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments to the Constitution. On the other hand, it dramatically impairs
the use of civil forfeiture as a crime-fighting tool.
Moreover, it creates certain tensions with the underlying concept of
what a civil forfeiture is and what justifies the seizure. If the starting point of
the civil forfeiture is that the "property is guilty," then it shouldn't matter
who the owner is or whether that owner is guilty of anything. The Supreme
Court has so held, on hard facts, allowing forfeitures of vehicles although
completely and demonstrably innocent parties hold property interests in the
vehicle. 150 These tensions are explored infra Section II.G. 1.
2. A Criminal Conviction of Someone, Not Necessarily the Owner
If the state decides to require a criminal conviction before the forfeiture
is allowed, that may be a step forward, but the constitutional protections
embedded in our criminal procedure will protect the owner of seized property
only if that owner is the person charged and ultimately convicted of the
crime.'5' When the owner is not the person convicted, there are separate
issues that remain to be litigated by this owner (who was not a party to the
criminal proceeding), including proof of the nexus between the property and
146 MINN. STAT. § 609.5313 (2017).
147 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 44-12-102(1), 44-12-207 (West 2017).
148 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1601(IXa) (2017). Also, forfeiture must be specifically pled within
criminal charge. Id. § 28-1602(1).
149 Other jurisdictions have moved this direction, but have stopped short of requiring criminal
convictions for all forfeitures. For instance, in the District of Columbia, there is no need for a criminal
conviction unless the property being seized is someone's primary residence. D.C. CODE § 41-308(d)(4)
(2017).
150 See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453 (1996); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505, 513 (1921) (upholding the forfeiture of a vehicle used to run bootleg liquor over the
protests ofthe undisputedly innocent note holder, who had a security interest in the car).
151 Cf Pimentel, supra note 4, at 4 ("Because the procedural standards for criminal conviction-
including burdens of proof and Fourth (seizure), Fifth (due process), and Sixth (right to counsel)
Amendment protections-are so high, [criminal] forfeitures have not been controversial.").
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the crime and, to the extent a statute makes it relevant, the level of culpability
of the owner.'5 2 These issues will be addressed in turn.
3. Allowing Exceptions to the Criminal Conviction Requirement
There is a dramatic difference between requiring proof that a crime took
place and requiring a criminal conviction of the owner of the property, or of
anyone else. If the police find drugs and a large quantity of cash in the back
seat of a taxi, the police may be quite confident that a crime occurred but may
have no idea who committed it. They may be able prove, even by the highest
standards of proof, that someone possessed and, perhaps, distributed the
controlled substance, but they have only the most speculative basis for
believing that the owner of the taxi is guilty of that crime or any other. Far
more likely, the culprit was one of the taxi's customers, whom it may be
impossible to find and prosecute. The problem is compounded when the
suspect is a fugitive, or is outside the country, beyond the reach of local law
enforcement. In this situation, law enforcement will be unable to secure the
criminal conviction necessary for a forfeiture of the cash and drug
paraphernalia found in the taxi.
Florida's statute provides a nice solution to this problem. While Florida
does not require a criminal conviction, it does require an arrest before a civil
forfeiture can be executed.53 But recognizing circumstances in which an
arrest may not be possible, Florida carves out a couple of exceptions,
identifying circumstances when forfeitures may still be executed absent the
arrest:
(1) The owner of the property cannot be identified after a diligent search, or the person in
possession of the property denies ownership and the owner of the property cannot be identified
by means that are available to the employee or agent of the seizing agency at the time of the
seizure.
(2) The owner of the property is a fugitive from justice or is deceased. 15
Such a provision could easily be applied to a conviction requirement for a
forfeiture, when it is obvious a crime has been committed but the suspect (1)
cannot be identified, (2) is a fugitive, or (3) is deceased.'
5
152 See id. at 26-27 (highlighting issues that forfeiture poses uniquely to innocent owners).
153 FLA. STAT. § 932.703 (2017).
154 id.
155 Pimentel, supra note 4, at 5.
[VOL. 25:1
CIvL ASSET FORFEITURE ABUSES
F. The Nexus Between the Property and the Crime
The fact that a crime was committed-even if proved beyond a
reasonable doubt and even if the owner is the person convicted-does not
itself justify the forfeiture of any property in the vicinity. The state should
have to prove that the property was either (1) proceeds of the criminal activity
or (2) utilized in facilitating the commission of the crime. Yet there appears
to be little to stop law enforcement from scooping up anything of value at the
time of an arrest and treating it as forfeitable unless and until the forfeiture is
challenged. This is another species of overreach in forfeiture practice: not
simply seizing property on flimsy evidence of wrongdoing, but of seizing too
much property even when the evidence of wrongdoing is strong.
A particularly egregious example comes from a case in Michigan in
which a self-described "soccer mom" was subjected to a drug raid, prompted
by her status as a registered provider of medical marijuana. 156 The invasive
raid included the seizure of an astonishing array of valuables from her home:
"[T]hcy proceeded to take every belonging in my house. And when I say every belonging, Imean every belonging." That included, she said, her husband's tools, the lawnmower and a
bicycle. They took credit card statements, tax returns, and the public assistance card Shattuck
used to help feed her family. They even took $90 worth of birthday money out of her daughter's"pink bedroom," as it's listed in a summary of seized property compiled by the police.
"My children's artwork was on the floor with boot-prints on it," she says, recalling what she
saw when she returned home. She testified that they hung her lingerie from the ceiling fans.
The men took her vehicles, which she said included the car seats for the smaller children. 157
A similar incident, spelled out in a legislative hearing in Michigan, depicts
the sweep of such seizures. "A medical marijuana patient, [Ginnifer] Hency's
home was raided and officers confiscated thousands of dollars of property,
including televisions, her children's iPads, and even a vibrator, ten months
earlier. 'Why a ladder? Why my vibrator? I don't know either. Why TVs?'
Hency told a house judiciary meeting last May [2015]." 151 Although Hency
was cleared by a judge, she was still trying to get her possessions back ten
months later. 119
Indeed, the fact that the state obtains a criminal conviction does not
speak to the question of whether the property seized was sufficiently
connected to that crime to warrant seizure. The state may need to articulate
156 Christopher Ingraham, Why Armed Drug Cops Took 'Every Belonging'from a Michigan Soccer
Mom, WASH. POST (June 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.conmnews/wonk/wp/2015/06/03/why-
arm3ed-deg-cops-took-every-belonging-7from-a-miehig8n.sccer-om/?utm-tenn=.3b~f8113ae78.
157 id.
158 Sean Allocca, How States Are Curbing Millions of Dollars in Police Seizures, FORENSIC MAG.
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specifically how the owner's rights may be protected in the making of such
a determination, in (1) allocating the burden of proving such a connection to
the government, (2) establishing a sufficiently high standard of proof, 16 and
(3) ensuring that the claimant had adequate access to counsel in what is
certainly a complex legal proceeding, etc. 161
G. Degree of Culpability (or Innocence) of the Owner
A separate concern deals with the level of culpability required of the
owner. Historically, of course, no culpability was required; it was enough
that the property was guilty, and that guilt could be fully demonstrated by
showing that a crime had been committed and that there was a nexus between
the property and the crime.162
But that is not enough to satisfy modern sensibilities about justice in
these cases. Indeed, concern for entirely innocent owners is a critical impetus
for the forfeiture reform efforts that have developed and that continue to
develop across America. CAFRA, the federal reform in 2000, created a
statutory "innocent owner" defense to forfeiture, although it placed the
burden of proving innocence on the owner asserting the defense.
63 The
House Judiciary Committee stated in its report that such protection for
innocent owners was "required by fundamental fairness."'
164
Consistent with this thinking, most states that have taken up forfeiture
reform have introduced some kind of protection for innocent owners.
65 But
the provisions vary widely, and the question remains as to how much owner
culpability must be shown before it is fair to seize the property.
Some jurisdictions (e.g., New Hampshire and D.C.) protect owners who
never consented to the illegal use of their property. 
6  Others (e.g., Maryland,
160 The standard of proof for establishing that nexus is discussed infra Section II.H.2. This offers
little comfort, of course, to Mrs. Bennis, who has been deprived of her car based on a third party's actions,
taken without her consent or even her knowledge. She was, apparently and perhaps obviously, entirely
innocent in the affair-her husband's unduly public engagement of a prostitute in the family car--that led
to the seizure of the car she had a half interest in. See generally Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
161 New Mexico has responded to most of these concerns, providing, as described above, for a
hearing after the criminal case, before the same jury, on the issue of forfeiture, and requiring the
government to prove the nexus between the property and the crime by clear and convincing evidence. See
discussion supra Section II.A.3.
162 See Pimentel, supra note 4, at 8.
163 See id. at l9.
164 H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, at 31.
165 See Carpenter et al., supra note 
2, at 18.
'66 D.C. CODE § 41-302(b) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:17-bII) (2017). Specifically,
the District of Columbia requires both consent and actual knowledge. D.C. CODE § 41-302(b). The D.C.
statute muddles this standard, however, by stating willful blindness as an alternative, but without making
it clear whether willful blindness can substitute for consent as well, or only for actual knowledge: "No
property shall be subject to forfeiture by reason of an act or omission committed or omitted without the
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Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, and Minnesota) provide that lack of
consent is not enough and extend innocent owner protection only if the owner
is without actual knowledge of the illegal use,'67 although some (e.g., D.C.
and Minnesota) will protect the owner who has actual knowledge but takes
reasonable steps to prevent the illegal use.6 1 Still others (e.g., Florida) will
deny the defense to owners who "should have known" that their property was
being used illegally. 169 Some (e.g., D.C., Maryland, New Mexico, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Florida) single out holders of security interests in property
and grant them special protections. 170
Minnesota affords protection against forfeiture in a variety of other
owner innocence circumstances. ' Landlords, for example, will not lose their
property because of the actions of tenants, as long as landlords cooperate with
authorities either by evicting the tenant or by assigning the right of eviction
to law enforcement."7 Parents of the wrongdoer will not lose their real
property because of criminal activity of their child on the property, unless the
parents "knowingly acquiesce" in the activity173 Common carriers are
similarly protected, as long as the carrier does not consent to, or is not privy
to, the illegal use. 74 Similarly, the District of Columbia also affords an
affirmative defense if an owner can prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he either took reasonable action to prevent the commission of
the crime, as noted above,'17 or his failure to do so was "because [he]
actual knowledge and consent of the owner, unless the owner was willfully blind to the knowledge of the
act or omission." Id.
167 MD. CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 12-103(a)-(b) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 609.5311(3Xd) (2017); MONT.
CODE §44-12-21 (West 2017); NED. REV. STAT. § 28-1601(3) (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-7.1(a)-
(g) (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.04(E) (West 2017). Vehicles seizures in Maryland are harder
to do, as the government must show that the owner consented to or is privy to the drug violation. MD.
CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 12-205.
168 D.C. CODE § 41-308(0(1); MINN. STAT. § 609.531 1(3)(g).
169 FLA. STAT. § 932.703(7) (2017). Interestingly, if the owner is lienholder the state must prove
"actual knowledge, at the time the lien was made, that the property was employed or likely to be employed
in criminal activity. Id. § 932.703(7)(b). This is much higher than the "should have known" standard for
other types of property owners. Florida also protects the rights of innocent co-owners by giving them the
right to buy out the forfeitable interest of co-owner. Id. § 932.703.
170 D.C. CODE § 41-308(2); FLA. STAT. § 932.703(7Xb); MD. CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 12-402(c);
MICH. COMP. LAws § 333.7523(3) (2017); MINN. STAT. §. 609.5311(3)(e); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-
10(a)(I).
171 MINN. STAT. § 609.5311.
172 Jd. § 609.5317.
173 Id. § 609.531 1(3Xg). A provision like this would have protected the Lopes family from losing
their home, simply because their son, over their objections, planted a marijuana patch in the backyard. See
Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 35.
174 MINN. STAT. § 609.531](3)(c).
175 D.C. CODE § 41-308(l)(1).
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reasonably believed to have done so would have placed [him] or a third party
in physical danger."1
76
Some states, like the federal government post-CAFRA, spell out
protections for people who acquire forfeitable property after the fact. Under
CAFRA, the definition of an "innocent owner" includes "one who, at the time
he acquired the interest in the property, was a bona fide purchaser or seller
for value and [was] reasonably without cause to believe that the property was
subject to forfeiture."'77 Ohio protects "bona fide purchaser[s] for value...
reasonably without cause to believe that [the property] was subject to
forfeiture."' 7 8 In the District of Columbia, the owner who acquires the
property without reason to know it was subject to forfeiture enjoys a
rebuttable presumption of nonforfeitability. 179
All of these provisions appear to be reasonable and/or justifiable, in
terms of protecting innocent parties from the otherwise indiscriminate reach
of civil asset forfeiture. Some are stronger and more effective than others,
particularly when one considers the allocation of the burden of proof and the
standard of proof to be applied, which will be discussed infra Section II.H.
Of particular concern, however, are the many states that contain no particular
protection for innocent owners. Because innocent owner protections cannot
be found in the common law or in equitable precedent, nor in the guarantees
of the due process clauses or takings clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments,'80 the absence of a state statute can be fatal to the claim of a
genuinely innocent person, deprived of her property at the hands of
overzealous or simply self-interested law enforcement.
1. Dissonance in the Legal Theories
To the extent that states want to preserve the concept and structure of
civil forfeiture, but condition it on the proven criminal conduct of the owner,
they blur the line between civil and criminal forfeitures and create tension
with the doctrinal foundation for civil forfeiture. Conceptually, if the process
is in rem, then what matters is the guilt of the property, and the guilt of the
owner is irrelevant. The owner, though entitled to at least constructive notice
of the seizure, is not technically even a party to the proceeding unless and
176 Id.
177 H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 16(1999).
178 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2981.04(EXI)(d)(ii) (West 2017).
179 D.C. CODE § 41-308(g). Specifically, the District of Columbia provides a rebuttable presumption
that the property is not forfeitable to owners who acquired their interest in the property after the
commission of the forfeitable offense, and the owner did not know or have reason to know the property
was forfeitable. Id. § 41-308(g)(1). The government may rebut this presumption by showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the property was proceeds of the forfeitable offence and the owner did not
provide fair consideration for his interest in the property. Id. § 41-308(g)(2).
180 See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442,446(1996).
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until she intervenes, by filing a claim to the property, and thereby challenging
the forfeiture.
At the same time, there can be little doubt that the owner of the property
suffers the loss of a legal interest when the assets are forfeited, even if her
right to guilty property is not constitutionally protected. 18 And Congress, by
creating an "innocent owner" exception to federal forfeitures in 2000,182
albeit one that puts the burden on the owner to prove her own innocence, has
already pierced the guilty property fiction anyway. That is, CAFRA
acknowledges that the innocence of the owner may be a circumstance of
sufficiently compelling import that it supersedes the guilt of the property and
blocks the forfeiture. 83
On the other hand, if criminal conviction is required of someone, but not
necessarily the owner-meaning the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the crime occurred but not that the owner bears guilt-there is no
tension in the doctrinal foundation for the forfeiture.
Of course, the pure theory of guilty property is a legal fiction today. It
makes little sense to punish property for its involvement in crime: property
cannot be deterred from future criminal activity and cannot be punished in
any meaningful way (even the seizure of property from its owner punishes
only the owner and not the property).84 The innocent owner defense,
therefore, is important as an acknowledgement hat it is really the owner
being punished and that such punishment is indefensible unless the owner
bears some guilt.
2. Other Crime-Specific Variations
Some states have carved out exceptions for certain types of crimes,
generally banning civil forfeitures otherwise.8 Nebraska eliminated state-
law-based civil forfeitures absent a criminal conviction but went one step
181 See id. at 443; J.w. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1921)..
182 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2012 & Supp. 112016).
183 Id.
184 This conclusion follows from the practice of repurposing the seized property. The "goring ox,"
often cited as one of the earliest examples of in rem forfeiture, is a counterexample. See, e.g., Jacob J.
Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death
and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 180-81 (1973). Under Mosaic Law, the ox
who killed a man was to be killed and its meat "not... eaten." Exodus 21:28 (King James) ("If an ox gore
a man or a woman, that they die: the ox shall be stoned and his flesh shall not be eatcr"). Today, if an ox
were used in the commission of an assault, the forfeiture would not result in the killing of the ox and the
wastingof its meat. Rather, the ox would be seized and sold, with law enforcement reaping the proceeds
of sale, and the new owner appropriating the still-valuable ox.
185 Several states explicitly list what offenses can subject property to a forfeiture. For instance, Ohio
defines "offenses subject to forfeiture proceeds" as a violation of one of the listed criminal offenses within
the definition. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.21 (A)(1) (West 2017).
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further to limit the remaining criminal forfeitures to cases involving drugs,
child pornography, or illegal gambling. 86 It is not entirely clear why
forfeitures should be a meaningful crime-fighting tool, or, perhaps revenue
source, for some crimes but not others. One possibility is that certain types
of crimes are likely to result in "proceeds" forfeitures, as opposed to
"facilitating property" forfeitures, and as already noted, proceeds forfeitures
have a far more compelling policy foundation. Indeed, drug and gambling
offenses (two of the crime categories singled out by Nebraska's statute'
87) are
likely to be cash-intensive enterprises-taking the profit out of them may be
a high priority. But any proceeds forfeiture will take the profit out of crime,
so this distinction, discussed infra Section U.K., may be a more meaningful
distinction that one based on the particular types of crime.
H. Shifting and Raising Burdens of Proof
As discussed above, historically, an in rem civil forfeiture required only
probable cause, at which point the burden of proving the property's
innocence shifted to the owner/claimant. 188 That means, of course, that there
was no need to prove-by the higher standards that typically apply in
criminal law-that a crime had been committed. Prosecutors who lacked
sufficient evidence to make charges stick to any individual could nonetheless
pursue the assets and seize them on a comparatively tenuous evidentiary
basis. Unless the owner could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the property was innocent, the forfeiture was upheld.
This approach created an unseemly situation in which innocent property
owners bear the onus of proving their own innocence or, more precisely, their
property's innocence,'89 to retain what is rightfully theirs. Accordingly,
forfeiture reform statutes sometimes shift the burden to the state to show that
the property is forfeitable, rather than to allow the forfeiture absent proof of
nonforfeitability by the owner.
1. Shifting the Burden from the Owner to the State
Congress, when it began debating CAFRA, attempted to lay a far
heavier burden on the government seeking to seize assets. CAFRA succeeded
186 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1601(1) (2017). Similarly, in the District of Columbia "[only
property designated as forfeitable pursuant to a forfeitable offense shall be subject to forfciturc." D.C.
CODE § 41-302(a) (2017); see also OHI1O REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.21(A)(1) (listing all offenses subject to
forfeiture proceedings).
187 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1601(1) (2017).
188 See discussion supra Section 1.B.2.
189 As discussed above, statutorily crcated "innocent owner" defenses are now recognized in the
federal system, and in some state systems as well. See discussion supra Section I.G.2.
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in shifting, de jure anyway, the burden of proof to the government. 190 This
federal legislation initially proposed a higher, "clear and convincing"
standard of proof, by which the government would have to prove
forfeitability before the seizure could be upheld.'9 Only later was the bill
amended to adopt a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, 92 one of the
changes made to secure unanimous approval of CAFRA in the Senate. 93
This shifting of the burden of proof has had a far more modest impact
than was, perhaps, initially envisioned, in large part because unless the
forfeiture is contested-which occurs in only a fraction (estimated at 12-20
percent) of forfeiture cases carried out in federal court'94-the proceeding
bypasses the hearing process and the government is never actually put to its
proof. In other words, for up to 88 percent of forfeitures, the proportion that
go uncontested, the government still succeeds in seizing the assets based on
nothing more than probable cause. 195 Indeed, an "administrative forfeiture"
like this, carried out without judicial supervision, can be executed without
any showing at all for law enforcement bold enough to gamble on the owner's
timidity about challenging it.
Owners' reluctance to contest forfeitures may be explained by a variety
of factors that may have more to do with the expense of legal process, '96 or
with fear of incriminating oneself or others, in a proceeding perceived to be
stacked in favor of law enforcement anyway'97 than with the merits of the
forfeiture claim. Recognizing these concerns, states have enacted additional
protections for property owners. Specifically, regarding fear of
incrimination, Maryland excludes testimony given during a forfeiture
proceeding pertaining to ownership of the seized property from being used
in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 9 To the extent states require a criminal
conviction before a forfeiture can take place, they effectively require that the
190 18 U.S.C. § 983(cX1) (2012 & Supp. 111 2016).
191 146 CONG. REC. H2049 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2000) (statement of Rep. Hyde). Rep. Hyde cautioned
that "Congress remains extremely dubious as to the probative value of certain types of evidence in meeting
this standard," giving examples from cases: carrying large quantities of cash, purchasing airline tickets
with cash, dog-alerts on cash (absent evidence how or when the cash became tainted with drugs), and
matching a drug courier profile. Id. at H2049-50.
192 Id at H2(49.
193 The year 2000 being an election year, it was deemed particularly important that CAFRA secure
unanimous support, presumably in an effort to avoid creating a campaign issue against anyone running
for reelection.
194 See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 5 (stating that "88 percent" of civil forfeitures carried out by
the DOJ were done "administratively"); see also Cassella, supra note 55 (estimating that 80 percent of
federal forfeitures are "administrative" forfeitures, which can be carried out without a judge ever
approving them, or even seeing them).
195 See Cassella, supra note 37, at 15.
196 See Pirnentel, supra note 4, at 31.
197 Seeid. at31-32.
198 MD. CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 12-313 (2017). The statute does provide an exception for impeachment
at the criminal trial. IM
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civil forfeiture proceeding happen after the criminal trial, easing concerns
about self-incrimination at the forfeiture hearing. 199
No state currently provides counsel to property owners subject to
forfeiture proceedings.2°° Nevertheless, several states have enacted laws to
help property owners obtain counsel. For instance, in Montana, the property
subject can be released if "the property is the only reasonable means for the
claimant to pay the costs of legal representation in the forfeiture or criminal
proceeding. °20' New Mexico and the District of Columbia have enacted
similar provisions.202 Florida does not allow the seized property to be returned
to pay for a lawyer but articulates circumstances in which a property owner
who successfully contests a forfeiture can claim attorney's 
fees.20 3
Nonetheless, the reform requiring that the government bear the ultimate
burden of proof in state court forfeiture proceedings is salutary; indeed, it
functions as the state's formal recognition of the property rights of its
citizens. And for those who do choose to challenge the forfeiture, the fact
that the ultimate burden of proof rests with the government may make it
considerably easier to prevail.
2. Higher Standards of Proof
States need to be explicit, when raising the standard of proof, about what
they are demanding proof of. It depends, in part, on what the state is trying
to accomplish. If it is trying to protect innocent owners from having their
property seized, it will be important to require proof that the property owner
was indeed involved in the criminal activity that justifies the seizure. If the
state is clinging to the hoary tradition of in rem civil forfeitures, where the
only thing that matters is the guilt of the property, there should be no need to
demand proof that the owner is guilty of wrongdoing. Rather the emphasis
should be on proving first that a crime was committed, and second that the
property was indeed connected to the crime-either proceeds of the crime or
property used to facilitate the crime. Whatever the state is required to prove,
it may be a meaningful reform to increase the burden of proof the state must
199 See discussion supra Section II.A.3.
200 However, New Mexico states that a public defender may represent a criminal defendant at a
forfeiture proceeding related to a criminal offense. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-6(C) (2017).
201 MONT. CODE § 44-12-209(5)(c) (West 2017).
202 D.C. CODE § 41-306(gX1) (2017) ("If the owner establishes that there is probable cause that the
seized currency is necessary to assist the owner in securing counsel in a pending criminal matter related
to the seizure or to meet the basic necessities of life, including the purchase of food, payment of utilities,
provision of shelter, transportation costs, support of the owner's family, or operation of a lawful business,
the portion of the currency necssary for demonstrated needs shall be returned.") (emphasis added); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4.1(E)(3) (2017) (allowing return of property when "the property is the only
reasonable means for a defendant to pay for legal representation in a related criminal or forfeiture
proceeding").
203 FLA. STAT. § 932.704(10) (2017).
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satisfy before it can carry out the forfeiture. Recall that the overwhelming
majority of these cases (up to 88 percent, in federal court at least) never get
challenged at all, so the state in those cases is never required to meet its
evidentiary burden. But if the purpose of the reform is to rein in overreaching,
raising the burden of proof can have an impact: by making it easier for the
property owner to prevail in those few cases that are challenged, and by
encouraging more owners to contest the forfeitures. Ultimately, law
enforcement may think twice before seizing the property in the first place if
a demanding burden of proof will make the forfeiture difficult to defend in
court. Accordingly, some states have not only shifted the burden of proof to
the state but also raised that burden significantly.
a Standards of Proof That the Crime Was Committed
As discussed above, some states have opted to require a criminal
conviction before a forfeiture of related property can take place. In these
jurisdictions, therefore, the underlying crime must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
But in these states, the states are proving more than may be strictly
necessary to justify a forfeiture. A criminal conviction, after all, requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt not only that a crime was committed but
also who committed it. In concept, a forfeiture doesn't require the latter-it
should be enough to prove that the crime was committed. It is easy to imagine
a scenario in which a drug lab or growing operation is discovered, but the
operators were tipped off and fled before the bust, so there is no competent
evidence to convict anyone for the crimes of manufacture or cultivation.204
It might make sense, therefore, to require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that a crime was committed, without actually requiring a criminal
conviction. Florida's statute does this, requiring "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the [property] was being used in violation of the... Act.' '205 No
conviction is required, in fact, the statute is written in the passive voice,
requiring proof that the property "was being used," without any reference to
who may be responsible for such use.0 6
Most reform initiatives apply lesser standards-clear and convincing
evidence (e.g., Michigan 07) or even preponderance of the evidence (e.g.,
New Hampshire20S)--that the crime was committed. And these provisions are
lumped together with the standard of proof that the property was linked to
the crime, imposing a standard "that the property is subject to forfeiture" by
204 See discussion supra Section I.A.3.b.
205 FLA. STAT. § 932.704(8).
206 Id.
207 MICH. COM. LAw § 333.7521(2) (2017).
208 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:17-b(IV)(b) (2017).
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the applicable standard of proof.209 Of course, a property is subject to
forfeiture only if (1) a crime was committed and (2) the property was
connected to the crime.
210
b. Standards of Proof of the Nexus Between the Property and
the Crime
Even if it is abundantly clear that a crime took place, property typically
is not forfeitable unless it either was used to facilitate the crime or constitutes
the proceeds of crime. This nexus, connecting the seized property to the
crime, is an essential element of the forfeiture, and the burden of proving it
should presumably be borne by the state, although historically it fell to the
owner to prove the property's innocence.
21' But this raises the question of
what standard of proof applies, and some states are raising these standards.
Again, Florida adopts the highest standard, insisting that the connection
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt.
2"2 Nebraska's new legislation, for
example, which limits forfeitures to cases in which a criminal conviction has
been obtained, requires clear and convincing evidence of the property's
connection to the crime.213 This same standard applies to both proceeds
forfeitures and facilitating property forfeitures.
2t 4 A significant number of
states (e.g., Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, and
Ohio) have adopted similar standards, with statutes that require clear and
convincing evidence that the seized property was either an instrumentality of
the criminal offense or proceeds from it.2
15 In the District of Columbia, the
standard remains a preponderance of the evidence, except for vehicles and
real property; in those cases, the government must show the connection by
clear and convincing evidence.21 6 This makes it easier to seize cash (and guns
and other assets) but keeps the standard for taking cars and homes
significantly higher. Other states (e.g., New Hampshire), like the federal
government, have opted for a preponderance standard
217
209 D.C. CODE § 41-308(d)(1)(B) (2017).
210 See Cassella, supra note 37, at 15 ("In a civil forfeiture case, the government ... proves, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the property was derived from, or was used to commit, a crime.").
211 See Pimentel, supra note 20, at 15. CAFRA shifted this burden for federal forfeitures, at least for
the small percentage of cases where the forfeiture is contested. Pimentel, supra note 4, at 16-17.
212 FILA. STAT. § 932.704(8) (2017).
213 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1601(1Xc) (2017). Again, whatever proof the legislation requires of the
government is of little import when the forfeiture is uncontested, however, as so many of them are.
214 Id.
215 MD. CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 12-312(a) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAws § 333.7521(2) (2017); MINN.
STAT. § 609.531(6aXd) (2017); MONT. CODE § 44-12-207(1) (West 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-
4(a)-(b) (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2981.04(B), 2981.02(A); 2981.05(D)(3) (West 2017).
216 D.C. CODE § 41-308(dXl) (2017).
217 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:17-b(IV)(b).
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It is important to note that even where a lower standard has been
adopted, the forfeiture reform bills that have passed have succeeded in
shifting the burden from the owner to the government. Therefore, for a
seizure of cash in either the District of Columbia or New Hampshire, it is the
government's burden to show, by a preponderance, that the money is dirty.2 18
And that is a dramatic shift from the days when the owner bore the
evidentiary burden of demonstrating that the money was clean. 2 9
c. Standards for Owner Innocence
As already discussed, if the assets seized belong to someone other than
the alleged criminal, there are separate issues surrounding the forfeitability
of the property. The "innocent owner" defenses are designed to deal with the
inequity inherent in seizing property from blameless individuals.220 In the
federal arena, CAFRA created such a defense but labeled it an affirmative
defense, so the claimant can prevail only if he comes forward and produces
evidence to prove his innocence.221 CAFRA has been criticized elsewhere for
putting this burden on an innocent party.m Nevertheless, it was a step
forward.
New Mexico improves on the CAFRA standard dramatically, allowing
a civil forfeiture only if the state, after obtaining a criminal conviction in the
underlying case, can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
property owner had "actual knowledge of the underlying crime giving rise to
the forfeiture.' '2 23 This, in effect, puts the burden back on the state to prove at
least knowledge by the owner, and to do it by clear and convincing evidence.
It does not require proof of guilt-the property owner need not be guilty of
the underlying crime, or of any crime at all-but it makes clear that a property
owner whose innocence is rooted in a lack of awareness of the crime should
keep her property. And in New Mexico, unlike in federal court, it is the
government's burden to prove such knowledge.224
The District of Columbia's forfeiture reform was designed to protect an
innocent owner, but not one who is aware of and consented to, or is willfully
blind to, the fact that someone is using her property for criminal activity. 2215
The forfeiture is still a civil one, based not on the owner's guilt but on the
218 D.C. CODE § 41-308(d)(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:17-b(lV)(b).
219 But, as noted before, the shifting of the formal burden of proof may be meaningful only in the
small percentage of cases where the forfeiture is contested.
220 See Pimentel, supra note 4, at 17-18.
221 See Smith, supra note 60, at 28.
222 See Pimentel, supra note 4, at 25.
223 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-7.1(F) (2017).
224 Id.
225 D.C. CODE § 41-302(b) (2017).
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owner's knowledge (or constructive knowledge) of the crime.
226 Nonetheless,
the District of Columbia's law will not allow the forfeiture of a primary
residence unless the owner is herself convicted of the underlying crime. 
27
I. Special Provisions Related to Cash
Seizures of cash have long been a problem area, featuring some of the
more glaring anecdotes of forfeiture abuse. Police practices in Tenaha,
Texas, seizing cash of passing motorists, attracted both media and legal
attention;22 a class action lawsuit ultimately put a stop to the worst abuses.
229
Because police require only probable cause to seize cash, sometimes the
existence of the cash alone-at least possession of a suspiciously large
quantity of it-has provided sufficient basis to seize it. Willie Jones
discovered this when he attempted to fly from Tennessee to Texas, carrying
$9,000 in cash.230 With suspicions based solely on the quantity of cash, he
was detained on suspicion of dealing drugs.231 Jones's background check
came up clean, but the officers kept the cash anyway,
23 2 refusing even to
count it or give Jones a receipt for it.2
33
From the perspective of the agency making the seizure, cash is
preferable to other assets. It is already liquid and can be spent on whatever
the agency needs. It is easy to articulate justifications for seizing cash, too,
as illustrated by the examples above and further explained below.
First, a lot of cash has drug residue on it,23 and drug-sniffing dogs will
alert to it, giving a handy basis for suspecting the cash-holder of drug
offenses. The problem, of course, is that there can be no way of
distinguishing the cash-holder, who taints his own money with drugs, from
226 Id.
227 Id. § 41-308(d)(4).
228 See. Stillman, supra note i.
229 See Mukherjee, supra note 118.
230 See H.R. REP. No. 106-192, at 6 (1999).
231 See id.
232 See Jones v. U.S. Drug Enf't Admin., 819 F. Supp. 698, 706-07 (M.D. Tenn. 1993). The officers
attempted to rely also on a "hit" by a drug-sniffing dog on the money itself, but the court found that
evidence to be of little value. See id. at 719-20.
233 See id. at 707. After two years of litigation and a week-long trial, the court held that the
government had failed to show that they had even probable cause for the seizure. Id. at 724. Jones is an
exceptional case, as be, unlike most, chose to contest the forfeiture in court.
234 Estimates run as high as 96 percent of paper money in circulation in the U.S. is contaminated
with illegal drugs. See United States v. $80,760.00 in U.S. Currency, 781 F. Supp. 462,475-76 n.32 (N.D.
Tex. 1991) (quoting a newspaper article describing the results of a study at National Medical Services in
Willow Grove, Pennsylvania: 80 percent of the bills tested were contaminated); United States v. $83,375
in U.S. Currency, 727 F. Supp. 155,160 (D.N.J. 1989) (describing testimony of Jay Poupko, Ph.D., who
found in a study that 96 percent of the bills in circulation were contaminated).
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the innocent cash-holder who receives drug-tainted money in an otherwise
legitimate transaction. The district court in Mr. Jones's case agreed:
The presence oftrace narcotics on currency does not yield any relevant information whatsoever
about the currency's history. A bill may be contaminated by proximity to a large quantity of
cocaine, by its passage through the contaminated sorting machines at the Federal Reserve
Banks, or by contact with other contaminated bills in the wallet or at the bank.235
Not all courts have reached the same conclusion, and that may embolden
further cash seizures based on little more than a dog alert.236 Second,
possession of a large quantity of cash can be deemed suspicious in itself.
There are myriad examples of individuals being relieved of their cash by law
enforcement officers who assert that "law abiding citizens don't carry this
much cash," even in situations where the individual was able to give a
compelling explanation for why he or she was carrying so much cash. 237
Third, since a lot of crime is carried out for profit, it is easy to make a
logical connection between money and crime. Money can be "facilitating
property" if the crime involved sale of drugs or of anything else prohibited
by law,238 structuring financial transactions,239 money laundering,240 or
gambling.24 "Proceeds" of criminal activity, of course, are also likely to be
reflected in cash holdings.242
But deducing that "proceeds" of crime are likely to be cash is a very
different thing from deducing that cash is likely to be proceeds of crime. And
it is this latter presumption that opens the door to abuse of forfeiture
235 Jones, 819 F. Supp. at 720 (citations omitted).
236 See, e.g., United States v. $22,474 in U.S. Currency, 246 F.3d 1212, 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001)
(involving facts similar to those of Jones and finding that there was probable cause to seize the cash, based
in large part on the dog's alert on a large quantity of cash). But see United States v. $242,484.00, 351 F.3d
499, 510-11 (11th Cir. 2003) (deeming a drug dog's sniff of cash is "of little value" in determining
whether the currency is presently being used for narcotics trafficking because as much as 80 percent of
all cash in circulation contains drug residue); Jason R. Humke, Note, Passing The Buck An Analysis of
State v. Franco, 257 Neb. 15, 594 N. W.2d 633 (1999), and Nebraska's Civil Forfeiture Law, 83 NE .L.
REv. 1299, 1300 n.2 (2005) (listing cases that discount the value of dog alerts on cash).
237 See sources cited supra note 34.
238 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (2012 & Supp. HI 2016) (declaring as forfeitable "all moneys, negotiable
instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter").
239 Timothy J. Ford, Note, Due Process for Cash Civil Forfeitures in Structuring Cases, 114 MICH.
L. REv. 455, 456-57 (2015).
240 See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047, 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that
forfeiture allows the government to obtain the value of all property involved in a money laundering
offense, including the money or other property being laundered, and "any property used to facilitate the
laundering offense," including untainted, commingled property).
241 See, e.g,. In re Return of Property Confiscated October 30, 1999 from 411 East Mac Dade Blvd.,
856 A.2d 238, 249 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
242 United States v. Lyons, 870 F. Supp. 2d 281, 295-96 (2012) (holding defendants jointly and
severally liable to forfeit approximately $30 million in gambling proceeds).
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procedure by law enforcement authorities who come across significant
amounts of cash in their work. The temptation to seize cash is hard to resist,
and the rationalization for seizing it is all too easy to articulate. An arrest of
someone possessing marijuana, for example, is likely to result in the
forfeiture of all cash on her person, based on the assumption that such money
(1) might have been meant for further drug transactions or (2) could.be the
proceeds of past ones.
The upshot is that cash is particularly vulnerable to forfeiture abuse, and
for that reason, states may wish to pay particular attention to the problem of
cash seizures in their approach to forfeiture reform. In the District of
Columbia, for example, the law creates a presumption that cash amounts less
than $1,000 are not linked to the underlying crime; to seize cash in amounts
that low, law enforcement will need to make an evidentiary showing
sufficient to overcome that legal presumption. 2 43
Maryland, in turn, has legislated against seizures of cash when the
underlying crime is mere possession of controlled substances.
2" Cash
forfeitures are permitted there only if they are connected with manufacture
or distribution crimes.
45
Florida law requires that "[t]he determination as to whether to seize
currency must be made by supervisory personnel,"
46 imposing a check on
any avaricious impulse to which an individual officer may be subject in the
heat of the moment.
In Michigan, if cash is seized, the owner's attorney is entitled to
examine the cash at any time in the next 60 days, before it can be deposited. 247
This presents yet another safeguard, so the seizure of cash is somewhat less
automatic and somewhat easier to contest. Maryland allows deposit of the
seized money but does require that the cash be photographed before it is
deposited.2"4
These approaches all reflect innovation in targeting, and attempting to
limit, the most tempting and easiest to rationalize of all asset forfeitures.
249
243 D.C. CODE § 41-308(d)(1)(C) (2017). Idaho has proposed legislation, not adopted at the time this
was written, that would prohibit the seizure of cash based solely upon its quantity. The proposed
legislation would require some other indicia of criminal activity. H.B. 202, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho
2017) ("Mere presence or possession of United States currency, without other indicia, is insufficient
probable cause for seizure.").
244 MD. CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 12-102 (a)(7) (2017).
245 Id. Furthermore Maryland requires that any cash seized he immediately photographed and
deposited. Id. § 12-202(b).
246 FLA. STAT. §932.704(11)(c) (2017). Interestingly, in Florida, the requirement for an arrest does
not apply when the seized asset is cash. Id. § 932.703(1)(a)(5).
247 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7523(4).
248 MD. CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 12-202(b).
249 In Tennessee, a news team tracked the activity of law enforcement on Highway 40 for an extended
period. They found that "rather than working castbound lanes, where smugglers transport drugs to the
East Coast, officers focused on westbound lanes, where smugglers haul cash back to Mexico. A
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Hopefully, some of these limits on cash seizures can check law
enforcement's ability to seize cash indiscriminately.
J. Reporting
Good state legislation should require reporting of the seizures, including
amounts seized, and what was done with the proceeds. Some transparency
will help rein in abuses, as police may be embarrassed if they have to
publicize a pattern of overreaching with the seizures or featherbedding with
the proceeds. A little transparency can go a long way. As Justice Brandeis
said, "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman.'250
Effective reporting, however, will require that information about
forfeitures be collected in a way that makes sense and is made available to
the public and media in a manner they can access. New legislation in a
handful of jurisdictions-Nevada,251 New Mexico,252 Texas,53 and the
District of Columbia2 4-requires not only collection of the information but
also posting it online.251 The overwhelming majority of states do not post
anything online, and as many as seventeen states have no requirement to
collect, compile, or record data on forfeitures at all.256
Moreover, the agencies required to report data need a proper incentive
to keep good records. Some states, including those where reporting is
required by law, nonetheless have large gaps in their records and are missing
subsequent review of drug task force records indicated that officers made 10 times as many stops on the
westbound side of the highway as they did on the eastbound side." See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at
16.
250 LOuis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
251 S.B. 138, 78thSess. (Nev. 2015).
252 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-9 (2017).
253 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.06(g), (s) (2017).
254 D.C. CODE § 41-312 (2017).
255 See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 33. Idaho's proposed legislation, after passing out of the
House Judiciary Committee, was amended before going to the Senate in March 2017. Kimberlee Kruesi,
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Bill Cleares Idaho House, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 2, 2017,
https://www.apnews com/ 123d5d3l fdf4elc931 e03ecdd32bed4. In an effort to secure support from law
enforcement, the bill's reporting requirements have been watered down to the point where the data
collection is required to be done by each county and maintained in each county, without any reporting to
the Controller, or any other statewide office. See H.B. 202, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017). As a result,
even if this bill gets signed into law, the only way to obtain this information is to contact each of the forty-
four counties directly and request the information. Because no penalties or consequences are prescribed
for failure to maintain such information, it is highly unlikely that even the most determined investigative
reporter can acquire reliable statewide information about what's happening with forfeitures in the state.
256 See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 34-35.
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a lot of data.2" Florida law now imposes a fine of $5,000 on any agency that
fails to report as required by law.258 This may help, but for a large jurisdiction,
it may be far easier to pay a fine of this magnitude than to engage in the
tedious work of compiling accurate reports of forfeiture activity. The
temptation to dispense with the reporting requirements may be far greater if
the reports themselves paint an unflattering picture of the agencies' activities
in this area: for example, if they have to report on how much they've taken
in and what they've spent the money on
A meaningful reporting regime should be drafted to reveal several key
figures that reflect on the health of forfeiture practice in that state. The
number of seizures and the size of each one (valued in dollars)
259 should be
included along with the disposition of the seized assets, including
expenditures made with the liquid assets seized or with the funds generated
by liquidating other seized assets.
The funds generated through equitable sharing should be reported as
well, to depict the degree to which local agencies are avoiding state strictures
by shifting their forfeiture activity onto the federal track. There is some
evidence that states with more restrictive laws on forfeiture are much greater
participants in and consumers of federal equitable sharing fimds.
2 6
No less important is to sort these data according to the character of the
legal proceeding: (1) Were criminal charges brought? (2) Was a conviction
obtained? (3) Was the forfeiture contested? (4) Was the challenge brought by
the person charged with the crime, or by a third-party owner? A pattern of
small-value seizures, in which no criminal charges are brought and the
forfeiture is processed administratively (without challenge in court
proceedings), would certainly be a red flag. If the police in Tenaha, Texas,
had been writing reports containing this level of detail,
26' the abuses there
could have been exposed and curtailed much earlier.
257 See id. at 36 (noting substantial deficiencies in the states of California, Georgia, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, among others).
258 FLA. STAT. § 932.7062 (2017).
259 The valuation of seized assets will undoubtedly create challenges for the agencies, but they should
be capable of making estimates. Once the assets are liquidated, of course, the amount of cash generated
by the auctions can he recorded and reported.
260 See Carpenter et al., supra note 2, at 28 ("Given California's relatively restrictive civil forfeiture
laws, the state's poor ranking on equitable sharing-50th out of the 50 states and the District of
Columbia-underscores the circumvention risks the practice poses. Likewise, North Carolina requires a
conviction for most civil forfeitures and directs proceeds to public schools, earning the state a B+ for its
laws, yet it ranks 42nd for equitable sharing. New York, Indiana and Missouri all receive higher marks
than most states for their civil forfeiture laws but rank poorly for equitable sharing, at 49th, 39th and 34th,
respectively.").261 See Stillrman, supra note 1.
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K Distinguishing Between Proceeds and Facilitating Property
What we have very little of, in the state statutes, is a distinction between
proceeds forfeitures and facilitating property forfeitures. To the extent that
states want-or need-to strike compromises, recognizing the importance of
forfeitures to law enforcement as a tool in their war on crime, this distinction
deserves more attention than it is getting.
In Minnesota's new law, there is some recognition of the importance of
this distinction. The law there now forbids the seizure of a vehicle as a
facilitating property forfeiture on the basis of drugs found in the vehicle
valued less than seventy-five dollars,262 presumably because this is a
disproportionate response to a minor offense.263 This contrasts with the
forfeiture of a vehicle purchased with dirty money, which should be seized
as ill-gotten gains-there is no risk of disproportionality in a proceeds
forfeiture (as long as the assets seized are genuinely proceeds).264
Indeed, proceeds forfeitures are important in taking the profit out of
crime and are rooted in equitable principles of unjust enrichment. States have
a legitimate interest in denying criminals the fiuits of criminal activity.
Accordingly, if some civil forfeitures are to be retained as part of a larger
reform, it makes sense that proceeds forfeitures should get this privileged
treatment over facilitating property forfeitures. As long as the government
can prove its case that these assets are, indeed, the proceeds of crime,261 there
should be little objection to their seizure.
262 MINN. STAT. § 609.5311(3) (2017).
263 See Nick Wing, Court Says Cops Wrong to Seize Car over $20 Of Weed, But Not for Reason
You'd Think, HUFFINiTON POST (Oct. 14, 2015, 6:48 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.comentry/michigan-police-asset-seizureus_561e94a7e4b028dd7ea62184
(relating the story of a vehicle seizure based on a minor offense in Michigan, and highlighting the seizure's
problematic disproportionality).
264 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (finding that if the disproportionality
is "gross," then the forfeiture may be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines
clause). For a more detailed treatment of Eighth Amendment application to civil forfeitures, see generally
David Pimentel, Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: A Practical Approach to the Excessive Fines
Clause as a Check on Government Seizures, 11 HARV. L & POL'Y REv. 541 (2017).
265 See Pimentel, supra note 4, at 55 ("The risk of infringing the rights of legitimate property holders
is somewhat greater... because sometimes difficult factual question must be settled as to which property
was acquired by criminal activity."). The primary risk for proceeds forfeitures is that the state will be able
to seize the assets without having to prove that it is actually the proceeds of crime. Administrative
forfeitures (i.e., uncontested seizures, where law enforcement never has to make its evidentiary showing)
are particularly problematic for these seizures, which include a lot of the cash grabs discussed separately
above. For that reason, "[niotice and hearing requirements should be more stringent for proceeds
forfeitures .... Not only do the seizures of cash need judicial scrutiny, but difficult factual issues-
involving the sources of funds and commingled accounts-are likely to arise and will need to e resolved."
Id. at 56-57.
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Facilitating property forfeitures, in contrast, are already of dubious
conceptual merit.2a These forfeitures are of property legally obtained (unlike
proceeds) and legitimately held (unlike contraband) and are much harder to
justify on a policy basis.267 It is here that innocent parties are at greatest risk.
A reasonable reform of civil forfeiture should, therefore, target facilitating
property forfeitures in particular.26 The primary downside of fi-ustrating such
forfeitures is that it will be much harder for our system to punish wrongdoers
if we have to prove guilt before punishing them. 2
69The debate over this issue,
of course, was settled many hundreds of years ago, when the common law
embraced the presumption of innocence.
270
CONCLUSION
As concerns about civil forfeitures roil the electorate, state legislators -
may be motivated to step in, rein in law enforcement, and curtail the most
serious abuses of the procedure. The various tweaks that have been proposed,
and that can be made, may sound good, but meaningful reform in this area is
elusive.
States wishing to scale back the offensive uses of forfeitures within their
borders need to take specific steps to ensure that the reforms have their
intended impact. Merely shifting or increasing burdens of proof may have
little impact, for example, when the overwhelming majority (up to 88
percent) of forfeitures are carried out administratively, without the
government ever being asked to make its proofs.
Shutting down equitable sharing with federal authorities, as well as
operations under separate municipal authorizations, is critical. Partial
shutdowns-adopting exceptions that would allow equitable sharing for
large dollar seizures, for example-create dangerous opportunities to
perpetuate the very evils the reform is intended to curtail, particularly
because there are such strong financial incentives to perpetuate the practice.
To address the problematic incentives, the states should ensure that the assets
266 See Pimentel, supra note 4, at 58.
267 See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
268 See Pimentel, supra note 4, at 58-59.
269 The author attended a hearing on forfeiture reform before Idaho's House Judiciary Committee on
February 27, 2017, and met with a legislator individually about the pending bill on March 13, 2017. The
arguments articulated were startling to hear, that civil forfeiture is an important means ofpunishing people
you know are guilty, but can't prosecute in the regular way. That makes it a power law enforcement tool,
no doubt, but it assumes that constitutional protections promised to all Americans, innocent and guilty
alike, are something that can and should be circumvented to permit punishment without proof of guilt.
270 See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-61 (1985) (tracing the history of the presumption
of innocence); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (making clear that the presumption of innocence
is constitutionally protected: "[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged").
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seized go to the general fund, or to public education, or to something else
from which the law enforcement authorities cannot benefit even indirectly.
Again, the financial incentives are simply too great to resist, and unless that
spigot is shut off completely, loopholes and workarounds will be found,
devised, and exploited.
Finally, a solid reporting system should be adopted to ensure that the
other branches of government, and the public at large, can see how much is
being seized and what is happening to it. The scrutiny itself will prompt some
restraint on the part of law enforcement. Moreover, whatever reforms are
adopted may need to be adjusted in the future, to account for unanticipated
outcomes, and it is critical that legislatures have the information they need to
determine whether forfeiture abuse has been contained, and to what degree it
remains a problem.
State authorities are to be commended for their desire to fLx a problem,
particularly one that is undermining public confidence in government and
police. But they need to be aware of what reforms may be meaningful, and
which are not. The legislature needs to be kept honest every bit as much as
law enforcement does, and there is risk in this area that elected officials will
either naively believe or disingenuously claim that their weakly drafted
legislation has addressed the problem. The states that have yet to address the
serious problems in the law of forfeiture should learn from others' mistakes,
and be careful, as they work to lock the front door on objectionable practices
in this area, that they not leave the back door open.
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